# MSDI NATO – Solvency



## NATO Fails – Tech Areas

### Best 1NC Ev

#### \*\*Europe won’t cooperate on any of the three topic areas

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More importantly, the Europeans have largely been unable to bridge policy divides at home—among member states and between NATO and the EU. Rather than cooperate internally, and with the U.S. on how to use an array of new technologies to defend NATO nations, Europeans have been doggedly focused on protecting the privacy of Europeans—highlighting a difference in cultural values across the Atlantic. While a critical concern, it has often replaced a laser-like focus on the competitiveness of Europe’s own civilian technology sector. Meanwhile, Americans have focused intently on limiting China’s technological reach, but have done so unilaterally, without taking the time to bring Europeans along as full partners in the development of a strategy. It has been a bad combination. Late to the realization of the scope and ambition of China’s strategic deployment of technology, surveillance and disinformation, Europe is only now beginning to consider a common strategy to address these interlinked issues.

The results are obvious. Rather than focus on the connections between technology and the risks to liberal democracy, common goals in artificial intelligence, data protection or the proper use and limits on offensive cyber weapons, allies have spent their time arguing about taxes, regulatory differences, antitrust and standard-setting. No structured, strategically organized transatlantic dialogue currently exists to map joint goals in emerging technologies, from artificial intelligence to autonomous vehicles and factories, aerospace, biotechnology or Fifth Generation networks.

### Biotech

#### Biotech discussions lead to strong divisions – aff’s framing increases polarization

Michael Moran, 2012, Professor Emeritus of Government, University of Manchester – Chair, Nuffield Council on Bioethics https://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/assets/pdfs/Emerging\_biotechnologies\_full\_report\_web\_0.pdf, " Emerging biotechnologies: technology, choice and the public good" Nuffield Council on Bioethics (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)

Bio-optimism and bio-pessimism

1.4 In all of the fields in which biotechnologies may play a role – climate, food, energy, medicine, and the economy among them – we encounter both utopian and dystopian visions. The emerging field of synthetic biology, for example, has been compared to the ‘green revolution’ in the mid-20th Century and the ‘information revolution’ that followed it. Compared to the physical sciences, scientific understanding in the biosciences during the last few decades has achieved a very great deal in a very short time. On the other hand, useful biotechnologies have, so far, been much slower to appear and less transformative than public, policy makers and investors may have hoped or expected. External investment has moved away from the sector, business models have been thrown into turmoil and theories of innovation have been re-examined.3

1.5 As well as uncertainty about the likely scale (or timescale) of the impacts of prospective biotechnologies, there may also be significant disagreement about the nature and desirability of the impacts. Experience suggests that few benefits are obtained without some cost, and that few achievements are secured without repercussions. This suggests two axes against which attitudes and expectations concerning prospective biotechnologies may be plotted: those of impact (ranging from trivial to transformative) and benefit (beneficial to harmful). As biotechnologies are implemented and diffused, and evidence begins to accumulate, these expectations may be confirmed or confounded and the majority of evaluations may converge on a particular point, although this is by no means necessarily or inevitably the case.

1.6 Ambivalence about prospective biotechnologies may often give way to polarised views when key questions about technology are posed as if what was at stake was a matter of saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to some fixed idea of technological advance, rather than considering alternative directions for progress.4 The biotechnology wager, strong or weak, represents a position taken up in one quadrant of a matrix of possible attitudes to prospective biotechnology. However, it is likely that examples of all these attitudes can be found without too much difficulty in relation to almost any prospective biotechnology.

#### Biotech moral judgments leads to impasse

Michael Moran, 2012, Professor Emeritus of Government, University of Manchester – Chair, Nuffield Council on Bioethics https://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/assets/pdfs/Emerging\_biotechnologies\_full\_report\_web\_0.pdf, " Emerging biotechnologies: technology, choice and the public good" Nuffield Council on Bioethics (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)

4.12 Different cultures and religions have found ways of ordering living beings so as to express their relative importance but also, significantly, their continuity as a class (i.e. the relatedness, by intermediate steps or degrees of genetic similarity, of all living beings). The ‘great chain of being’ developed in medieval Christianity, for example, with God at its head and other beings arranged in descending degrees of perfection, has its roots in Plato and Aristotle; Darwinian evolution, and modern genetics similarly emphasise both continuity and difference in their theories of descent and inheritance. The distinctive autonomy of living beings is apparent in the often complex ways in which living things interact with and transform themselves and their environment, and by their powers of reproduction, allowing natural purposes – or ‘ends’ – to be imputed to them. Notions of a natural order, harmony and ends are deeply engrained in almost all cultures and bind groups and societies powerfully together. The term ‘the wisdom of repugnance’ has been coined to evoke and enjoin a shared sense of distaste for certain biotechnological practices that appear ‘contrary to nature’ in this sense.260 This notion is close to what, from a less sympathetic perspective, is often referred to as the ‘yuck factor’.261 Where such sentiments are widely shared they can form a powerful basis for moral restraint and, indeed, for positive legislation262; however, where there are moral disagreements, moral arguments can quickly reach an impasse (since my sentiment towards a given action does not logically contradict your different sentiment).

#### Biotech incentives lead to distrust

Michael Moran, 2012, Professor Emeritus of Government, University of Manchester – Chair, Nuffield Council on Bioethics https://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/assets/pdfs/Emerging\_biotechnologies\_full\_report\_web\_0.pdf, " Emerging biotechnologies: technology, choice and the public good" Nuffield Council on Bioethics (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)

Genetic modification and selection of crops traits

2.8 One of the first biotechnology fields to catch the public imagination and galvanise opinions was agricultural biotechnology.63 Despite the commercial failure of the first attempts to market GM tomatoes in the early 1990s,64 take up of the technology in the US has since proceeded rapidly.65 In the UK, by contrast, brief initial success with a similar product (Zeneca’s GM tomato paste) was halted abruptly by poor sales.66 Indeed, concern about the impact of GM crops on human health, the environment and economic wellbeing, has played a significant part in defining the political terrain of biotechnology policy in the UK and continental Europe,67 with levels of distrust and suspicion aggravated by apparently poorly framed attempts on the part of policy makers to engage with them.68

2.9 These controversies have been further compounded, particularly with initiatives to introduce GM crops in developing economies, by concerns about economic and social implications, such as concentration of industrial supply chains, ownership of intellectual property, and selection of products and technologies that prioritise private producer benefits at the expense of public benefits. Although the main firms involved use alternatives such as marker-assisted and genomics-assisted breeding alongside GM (as these different strategies are likely to have different levels of effectiveness depending on the traits of interest), the major bottleneck with all of these technologies remains in identifying the combinations of genes and other conditions responsible for the traits of interest.

67 See: Gaskell G, Einsiedel E, Priest S et al. (2001) Troubled waters: the Atlantic divide on biotechnology policy, in Biotechnology 1996-2000: the years of controversy, Gaskell G, and Bauer MW (Editors) (London: Science Museum)

#### Blanket bans fail to regulate biotech

NPA, 7-4-2021, NATO Parliamentary Assembly https://www.nato-pa.int/news/virtual-visit-france-nato-parliamentarians-discuss-space-security-biotech-advances-and-nato-st, "NATO PA," In virtual visit to France, NATO Parliamentarians discuss space security, biotech advances and NATO S&T cooperation | NATO PA (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)

lisande Nexon, Senior Research Fellow at the French Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS), noted that the international community has witnessed how biotechnology can help address healthcare issues in the context of COVID-19. Similar impacts, she argued, could be seen in areas like agriculture, environmental industries, or the materials industry. Still, she said, the stakes are high, as there are a variety of risks inherent in biotechnology, including laboratory leaks, environmental spill over effects and ethical issues.

Both experts cautioned against a blanket approach to the banning of certain biotechnologies or the prevention of their development as a whole. An appropriate approach would instead be to focus on legislation and multilateral cooperation\*\*,\*\* the Committee was informed. Ms Nexon emphasised that “we need to promote international cooperation and information exchange,” adding that difficulties exist because, “there are significant differences between states – whether national interests, regulations, views on [human rights], and financial resources.” The promotion of information exchanges, emphasis on improved transparency, and a general effort to raise awareness with the public of potential risks inherent in biotechnologies are all valid lines of action, she argued. To that end, NATO Allies should “train, regulate and encourage scientists to adhere to these approaches, and to evaluate risks and threats regularly with academia and scientists. It is important that we are able to recognise whether [an incident related to biotechnology] was accidental or deliberate, and whether we can attribute responsibility to a human actor […].”

### LAWS Disputes

#### NATO faces internal conflict over how to approach LAWS

Melissa Heikkilä, 3-29-2021, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.," POLITICO, <https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/> (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 6-28-2022)

The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban. Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.”

#### Many countries in NATO already support LAWS regulations or ban

Jamie Dettmer, 6-7-2021, "Possible First Use of AI-Armed Drones Triggers Alarm Bells ," VOA, <https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_possible-first-use-ai-armed-drones-triggers-alarm-bells/6206728.html> (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 6-28-2022)

A report by a United Nations panel of experts issued last week that concluded an advanced drone deployed in Libya “hunted down and remotely engaged” soldiers fighting for Libyan general Khalifa Haftar has prompted a frenetic debate among Western security officials and analysts. Governments at the United Nations have been debating for months whether a global pact should be agreed on the use of armed drones, autonomous and otherwise, and what restrictions should be placed on them. The U.N.’s Libya report is adding urgency to the debate. Drone advances have “a lot of implications regionally and globally,” says Ziya Meral of the Britain’s Royal United Services Institute, a defense think tank. “It is time to assess where things are with Turkish drones and advanced warfare technology and what this means for the region and what it means for NATO,” he said at a RUSI-hosted event in London. According to the U.N. report, Turkish-made Kargu-2 lethal autonomous aircraft launched so-called swarm attacks, likely on behalf of Libya’s Government of National Accord, against the warlord Haftar’s militias in March last year, marking the first time AI-equipped drones accomplished a successful attack. Remnants of a Kargu-2 were recovered later. The use of autonomous drones that do not require human operators to guide them remotely once they have been programmed is opposed by many human rights organizations. There were rumors that Turkish-supplied AI drones, alongside remote-guided ones, were used last year by Azerbaijani forces in their clashes with Armenia in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding territories.

#### LAWS have been used in active combat situations

Joe Hernandez, 6-1-2021, "A Military Drone With A Mind Of Its Own Was Used In Combat, U.N. Says," NPR.org, <https://www.npr.org/2021/06/01/1002196245/a-u-n-report-suggests-libya-saw-the-first-battlefield-killing-by-an-autonomous-d> (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 6-28-2022)

Military-grade autonomous drones can fly themselves to a specific location, pick their own targets and kill without the assistance of a remote human operator. Such weapons are known to be in development, but until recently there were no reported cases of autonomous drones killing fighters on the battlefield. Now, a United Nations report about a March 2020 skirmish in the military conflict in Libya says such a drone, known as a lethal autonomous weapons system — or LAWS — has made its wartime debut. But the report does not say explicitly that the LAWS killed anyone. "If anyone was killed in an autonomous attack, it would likely represent an historic first known case of artificial intelligence-based autonomous weapons being used to kill," Zachary Kallenborn [wrote](https://thebulletin.org/2021/05/was-a-flying-killer-robot-used-in-libya-quite-possibly/?utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=SocialMedia&utm_campaign=TwitterPost05202021&utm_content=DisruptiveTechnology_WasAFlyingKillerRobotUsedInLibya%3F_05202021) in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. The assault came during fighting between the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord and forces aligned with Gen. Khalifa Haftar, according to the [report](https://undocs.org/S/2021/229) by the U.N. Panel of Experts on Libya. "Logistics convoys and retreating [Haftar-affiliated forces] were subsequently hunted down and remotely engaged by the unmanned combat aerial vehicles or the lethal autonomous weapons systems such as the STM *Kargu*-2 ... and other loitering munitions," the panel wrote.

#### NATO lacks a unified response to LAWS, regulation or ban is needed to reconcile differing view between member nations

Brian Michelson, 2-23-2021, "Why NATO Needs Lethal Autonomous Weapon Standards," CEPA, <https://cepa.org/why-nato-needs-lethal-autonomous-weapon-standards/> (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc:6-28-2022)

While there is no agreed-upon international definition of lethal autonomous weapons systems, the U.S. Department of Defense [defines them](about:blank) as “weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.“ While these are not Schwarzenegger-style Terminators and still have a degree of human control over them, the technology enabling these systems is maturing rapidly, and military necessity will increasingly demand that these systems gain broader parameters of autonomous action. Yet despite the complexity of these systems and the inevitability of their proliferation, NATO does not currently have a [common standard](about:blank) for their use or development. In fact, some NATO countries even have [opposing views](about:blank) of how to handle them. NATO standards are designed to ensure compatibility among weapon systems, communication architecture, and a host of other warfighting systems. The 7.62mm small arms round is a good example of this. But what is the 7.62mm equivalent standard for the development and employment of autonomous weapon systems? This opens a host of related questions regarding the employment of these systems: What Identification – Friend – Foe (IFF) capability should ground and air units require to prevent fratricide? What degree of certainty does a lethal autonomous weapon system require before final engagement? What level of collateral damage is acceptable? What degree of compatibility between systems is required? Should all these parameters (and others) be adjustable, and if so, at what command level? The attendant ethics also need to be addressed. NATO’s experience in Afghanistan was a case study in the challenges of coalition warfare. Differing risk tolerances, legal requirements, ethical views, domestic political concerns, and at times simply combat capability, all combined into to complex policy cocktail that impeded the effectiveness of combat operations. While modern militaries have accountability, legal, and ethical systems incorporated into their command structures, they are not uniform and leaders in differing militaries have varying degrees of authority. The key questions hinge on two issues: Who gets to decide to employ an autonomous weapon, and who is responsible should things go wrong? The Kunduz hospital strike in October of 2015 was driven primarily by human error. Responsibility was fixed on the chain of command and 16 leaders were [disciplined](about:blank). Who will be responsible if a member nation conducts a NATO-authorized strike and it goes terribly wrong? If this framework is not thoroughly established ahead of time, not only is it likely that commanders may hesitate to use this capability, the risk-aversion inherent in bureaucracies may limit the development of autonomous weapons that will be needed in future conflicts. In the emerging field of lethal autonomous weapons, establishing a common NATO standard for the development and use of autonomous weapons will help address the gap in capabilities among NATO member nations. By establishing these standards, nations can ensure that their defense expenditures on autonomous weapons will create systems that are interoperable, able to contribute to NATO’s capability, and can be employed within defensible ethical guidelines.

### Piecemeal

#### Plan cannot unify NATO on tech – not coordinated to overcome taxes & 6G – plan’s piecemeal NATO-only approach fails

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Start with a Transatlantic Technology Forum

To emerge from the toxic spiral allies have created around hardware issues like 5G, and the regulation of U.S. tech giants like Google, Facebook and Apples platforms. Those issues are now complicated by the newer problem by the spread Chinese and other apps into our phones and our lives. To deal with these networked challenges we need a network. We would urge a single Forum: A broader, coordinated structure designed to marshal the plethora of issues in transatlantic technology policy, instead of the usual piecemeal conversations.

There are many ways to design such a Forum—but it must be an action group, not a set of bureaucratic study groups. We favor the recommendation of the Bipartisan Cyber Solarium group that the White House needs a senior cyber coordinator, who may also be a Deputy National Security Advisor (with appropriate staff and structure); if the White House is not at the center of this discussion, the U.S. will not have authority to speak within the Forum. Europeans, for their part, would need to stand up their own coordination mechanism between the EU Commission and member state governments, perhaps with an EU Tech Envoy who holds real authority and a NATO Cyber and Tech Envoy to consider the security implications of each move. Taken together, these executive roles should serve to oversee the whole range of inter-linked issues.

Specialized sub-working groups, such as the proposed EU–US Tech and Trade Council should address digital taxation and platform regulation in particular. Other key issues include digital supply chain security; joint industrial policy; digital currency and blockchain strategies; anticipatory joint standard-setting to avoid being pre-empted by Russian and Chinese measures; and innovative ways to combat the weakening of the fabric of our democracies by tech-driven interference. To address these issues, the Forum would need to deliberately cut across NATO, the EU, and many different departments of the U.S. government. But it must also include the private sector, R&D institutions, infrastructure operators and civil society. A NATO–EU Statecraft Initiative on Cyber should support this Forum, expanding on the NATO2030 plans announced in late November 2020. In coordination, a standing-group convened by the Forum would drive the transatlantic norm-setting process where Russia and China have recently dominated, such as in the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN–GGE) with like-minded democracies as part of a “Tech10” with the U.S. and European countries at the core.

To launch this new type of strategic cooperation in good faith, however, we will first need a truce on a number of issues currently causing acrimony in the transatlantic technology relationship, including on planned digital taxes by individual member states. The time it will take for the Commission’s Digital Services Act and the Digital Compass to be addressed by the European Parliament and EU Member States should also be used to broaden and elevate transatlantic cooperation through the Transatlantic Technology Forum. We suggest:

Enhance joint industrial policy to develop viable Western technology competitors. It’s not enough to try to insulate the West by cutting off Chinese access to U.S. and European markets. U.S. and European governments, in cooperation with major technology companies, must develop joint industrial policies and ethical standards to create viable Western competitors in 5G and other emerging technologies. These may include embracing open architectures that would essentially allow the West to develop a variety of different kinds of systems that would run on common, inexpensive hardware. We must recognize that we cannot beat Chinese products without similarly capable, and similarly priced, products of our own.

Retaining the “U.S. market reserve” for European providers Ericsson and Nokia, perhaps even joining forces with a U.S.–based chip-maker could set a real counterpoint to Chinese advances. This will require recognition that 5G is not just another iteration of existing services; it is a rewiring of the Internet. Recognizing this fact, Congress should extend R&D funding into 5G software standards to transatlantic partners, recognizing that this is as essential to weaving together common defenses as the Joint Strike Fighter is to weaving together NATO allies. The West—transatlantic allies plus, eventually other technologically advanced democracies—must develop a shared funding pipeline for 5G/6G and an emerging tech joint research platform (funded in part by joint government initiatives, but not government administered). The EU 5G toolbox and risk assessment mechanisms along the value/supply chain could be enhanced with U.S. and European intelligence assessments. Applying jointly agreed regulatory pressure to domestic technology distributors on each side could force the adoption of security standards throughout supply chains. Building “Clean networks,” a Trump era initiative worth building on, free of Chinese technology, could even be considered part of the 2% GDP goal in NATO.

As detailed elsewhere in this report, joint priorities to curtail Chinese overreach should be immediate priorities. These could include the pursuit of a transatlantic export control regime and expanded investment screening standards. Clearly, there must be improved commercial intelligence exchange to push back against Chinese cyber-espionage and IP theft at scale.

### Tensions disrupt tech coop

#### Plan isn’t interdisciplinary cannot drive politics, but politics can disrupt implementation

General Philip Breedlove (U.S.AF, ret.), 2-25-2019, Supreme Allied Commander Europe from 2013 to 2016 and is now a distinguished professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Dr. Margaret Kosal is an associate professor at the Sam Nunn School, where she focuses on technology, strategy, and governance.https://www.hoover.org/research/emerging-technologies-and-national-security-russia-nato-european-theater, "Emerging Technologies and National Security: Russia, NATO, & the European Theater," Hoover Institution (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)

With respect for the need to be strategic, this potential barrier reflects the need for effective science diplomacy to reach outside of science. Rarely, if ever, does science and technology itself drive foreign policy; the potential national security, economic, or other national- and international-level consequences of the application of science and technology to human endeavors is where science intersects with policy predominantly. Science and technology can be causal, intervening, or determinant factors. The ability to recognize, communicate, and identify nodes for intervention, change, or influence are strategic requirements for effective science diplomacy.

Most international legal and regulatory approaches to technologies and to emerging technologies—robotics, biotechnologies, synthetic genomics, gain of function research, nanotechnology, cognitive neurosciences, hypersonics, AI—are still driven by 20th-Century (or earlier) conceptions and institutions. Past methods for other technologies that do not take into account the international nature of the science and the industry are not adequate. Any international regime or approach must be interdisciplinary in focus, cognizant of the multi-polar post-Cold War world, and appreciate the role of private funders, commercial development, and transnational corporations. To be clear, there’s a lot of good in the arms control and nonproliferation existing institutions. Rather, these challenges are primarily political rather than technical. Being able to navigate and affect policy at the interface of science and international affairs is where we have immense value.

The tension between adoption and governance of technology must be considered as part of the balance of power. The utility of treaties may be better viewed as more than only a guarantee against using a weapon. Weapons treaties were never an ironclad guarantee that weapons would not be used. Treaties provide stability, reduce uncertainty; enable dialogue, and are confidence building measures. The utility of weapon prohibition treaties as balancing should not be ignored, not because of an idealized imagination that prohibition effectively and permanently limits proliferation or use of a technology but because the act of meeting, networking, building relationships, and negotiating provides a forum for interacting and addressing underlying issues. From this standpoint, governance approaches should be integral to an integrated military strategy for future capabilities development, not the afterthought that attempts to put the metaphorical genie back in the bottle.

## External Issues Gut NATO Coop

### NATO Distrusts USA

#### NATO is brain dead – tensions preclude political cooperation

China Daily 12-07-2020 https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202012/07/WS5fcd97f1a31024ad0ba9a417.html, "Difficult for NATO to reach consensus," No Publication (RyleeR/MSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

As the European countries are seeking more independence in diplomacy and security issues, the US' leadership in the organization and its ability to balance the interests of relevant parties in it is weakening. No wonder French President Emmanuel Macron once said that NATO is "brain-dead".

Originally, the subject of this video conference was neither the Eastern Mediterranean nor the relationship between Turkey and the United States.

According to the original agenda, the theme of the meeting was the "NATO 2030" reform proposals.

The foreign ministers of the NATO member states discussed 138 reform recommendations during the meeting, which will be submitted for discussion and approval of the state heads, including the determination that Russia will remain NATO's biggest opponent over the next 10 years; that China is not an opponent of NATO and NATO needs to engage with China on issues such as arms control and climate change.

Although the organization vows to make its decision-making more democratic and make itself not only a military alliance but also a political union by 2030 through carrying out the reform, the open wrangling between Turkey and the US indicates no reform will be easy, and it has a long way to go before realizing that vision.

#### US allies in Europe distrust the American rhetoric and commitment to the continent

**Keck, 13** (Zachary Keck, former Managing Editor of The Diplomat, former Deputy Editor of e-International Relation, author of The Pacific Realist, and former staffer at the Center for A New American Security and in the US Congress on defense issues. “Why Don’t Allies Trust the US?,” October 29, 2013, <https://thediplomat.com/2013/10/why-dont-allies-trust-the-us/>) (NBOYLE/MSDI, Acc: 7-4-2022)

A series of events in recent weeks has created a widespread narrative that the U.S. is an unreliable ally and a weak partner. First, the U.S. government shutdown forced President Barack Obama [to cancel his trip](https://thediplomat.com/the-editor/2013/10/04/obama-cancels-rest-of-asia-trip/) to a couple of Asia summits. Then, new Edward Snowden leaks revealed that the National Security Agency has been spying on up to 35 world leaders, [including top U.S. allies](https://thediplomat.com/the-naval-diplomat/2013/10/28/us-german-relations-the-view-from-berlin/) like German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Both events take place against a backdrop of concerns about U.S. credibility from top Middle East allies, most notably Israel and Saudi Arabia. Both countries are fearful that Washington [will cut a deal with Iran](http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/iran-the-case-rapprochement-9139) over its nuclear program, and have taken exception to the [Obama administration backing down](https://thediplomat.com/2013/10/07/syria-and-the-capping-of-executive-war-powers/) on its various threats against the Assad regime in Syria. Taken together, the general sentiment was summarized succinctly by former Vice President Dick Cheney, when [he observed that](http://washington.cbslocal.com/2013/10/27/cheney-mid-east-allies-no-longer-trust-the-us-enemies-dont-fear-us/) “our friends no longer count on us, no longer trust us and our adversaries don’t fear us.” Current circumstances provide a good test case into how nations calculate other countries’ credibility in general, and how the U.S. maintains and loses credibility with its allies in particular. U.S. foreign policy has often been formulated on the belief that nations will calculate U.S. credibility based almost entirely on its past actions. Indeed, huge strategic blunders like Vietnam were predicated on the arguments that the U.S. couldn’t withdraw from the fiasco without greatly concerning its other allies around the world. America’s current credibility crisis does not support this notion of credibility. Indeed, America’s post-WWII record of supporting allies in these regions is remarkable. In the Middle East, the U.S. has unflinchingly backed Israel since at least the late 1960s. Notably, when Israel faced an existential threat during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the U.S. quickly organized an arms resupply to Tel Aviv that helped empower the Israeli Defense Forces to defeat their adversaries. It also immediately approved credits to ensure Israel could pay for the weapons. It did so despite knowing full well that the Gulf States were likely to retaliate with their oil reserves. Despite the immense costs it paid for supporting Israel in 1973, America’s commitment to allies in the region has endured. Indeed, less than two decades later when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and seemed poise to continue on to Riyadh, the U.S. organized a rapid response in the form of Desert Shield. It later ejected Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and restored the royal family there. U.S. support for Western Europe in general, and Germany in particular, has been equally remarkable. Following WWII, the U.S. quickly went to work helping to repair the continent’s ravished economies. It also organized NATO to protect Western Europe from the seemingly imminent Soviet military threat. Although it has continuously prevailed on Europe to shoulder a larger burden in providing for its self-defense, its pleas have been rebuffed each and every time. The U.S. nonetheless continues to underwrite the continent’s security nearly a quarter century after the Soviet threat disappeared. The U.S. has expended considerable resources on Germany in particular. The Berlin Crises of the early Cold War were among the closest the U.S. and the Soviet Union ever came to war during their decades-long rivalry. After the Warsaw Pact collapsed, the U.S. played an integral role in helping West Germany smoothly absorb East Germany. The U.S. has an equally strong record in Asia, particularly when it comes to protecting countries that face a threat from China or its allies. Despite declaring South Korea outside of America’s security umbrella shortly before North Korea’s invasion, Washington led a UN-effort to repel Pyongyang’s attack on South Korea and restore the latter’s sovereignty. Similarly, despite long ago reaching a rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China, the U.S. has continued to protect Taiwan’s territorial integrity. It has done so at great cost to its relationship with Beijing, including almost coming to blows with China in the mid 1990s. Thus, the current impression in Asia, Europe and the Middle East that the U.S. is not a reliable ally cannot be based on a historical assessment of its reliability. Another theory on how nations calculate credibility comes from Daryl Press. In his book, [Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats](https://www.amazon.com/Calculating-Credibility-Leaders-Military-Security/dp/0801474159), Press argues that states calculate the credibility of military threats made against them based on how much the other state has at stake in the dispute, as well as its capabilities to make good on its threat. If the state making the threat has a lot at stake in a dispute, and it has the necessary military capabilities to carry out the threat it has made, then the target state will view the threat as credible. If it doesn’t have much at stake in the crisis and/or if it lacks the ability to carry out its threat at an acceptable cost, then the threat will not be seen as credible. Press’ theory better explains America’s current credibility crisis, especially in the Middle East and Asia. On the one hand, regional allies in the Middle East and Asia view America’s military power as in relative decline. In the Middle East, the U.S. is quite openly trying to eschew large-scale military commitments. U.S. allies are therefore concerned that the U.S. will ultimately accept an Assad victory in Syria and cut a nuclear deal with Iran rather than make a military commitment large enough to forcibly prevent either of these outcomes. In the case of Iran, Tel Aviv and Riyadh also worry the U.S. will reach a rapprochement with Iran in order to reduce the need for a robust U.S. military presence in the region. In East Asia, the concern is that the U.S. is in decline relative to China, or at least is too unstable at home or engaged in the Middle East to make a reliable, long-term commitment to the region. Although the U.S. has never failed to protect an ally from an aggressor in the past, as China rises relative to the U.S., deterring or defending against Chinese aggression will require an ever-greater share of U.S. resources. Leaders in Asian states wonder if the U.S. is stable or committed enough to make this investment. [Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.](https://thediplomat.com/subscriptions/) The concern of U.S. Asian allies highlights an inherent difficulty for U.S. credibility. Namely, as a regional hegemon, U.S. allies are inevitably more dependent on Washington than Washington is on them. Furthermore, regional states always have more at stake in regional developments than the U.S. does. To be sure, it is in the U.S. national interest to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon or China from dominating the Western Pacific. However, an Iranian nuclear bomb is by nature a much greater direct threat to Saudi Arabia and Israel than it is to the U.S. The same is true in Asia with China’s rise. Although the U.S. has a strong interest in preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon, it is a much more indirect than the interest U.S. regional allies have. Whereas China’s regional hegemony would mean the subjugation of its neighbors and their loss of sovereignty, for the U.S. it would only increase the potential for China to cause problems in other regions of the globe, including the Western Hemisphere. If history is any guide, and I believe it is, then this indirect threat is enough to keep the U.S. strongly engaged in the Western Pacific. Still, U.S. allies in the region have everything at stake in this game, and they therefore must always fear that the U.S. will decide to retreat behind the enormous protective barrier that is the Pacific Ocean. The U.S. can take various steps to lessen ally concerns about this potential, but it cannot eliminate them entirely. And thus, the U.S. can never be entirely credible in the eyes of its allies.

#### NATO was left fragmented in Trumps wake; distrust of the US only continues to grow

**Walt, 18** (Stephen Walt, a columnist at Foreign policy and the Robert and Renee Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard university, “NATO Isn’t What You Think It Is,” July 26, 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/26/nato-isnt-what-you-think-it-is/>) (NBOYLE/MSDI, Acc: 7-4-2022)

There’s no question that Trump’s handling of NATO has been deeply disruptive, to no good purpose. After all, if you want to get tough with China on trade and do more to constrain Iran’s activities in the Middle East, a smart strategist would get Europe on your side and work constructively with them toward these ends. Trump has done precisely the opposite: tearing up the nuclear deal with Iran, starting trade wars with everyone he can think of, insulting European leaders, and driving his own image (and that of the United States) down to [levels unseen](https://news.gallup.com/poll/225761/world-approval-leadership-drops-new-low.aspx) in years. That might suit some of America’s adversaries, but it is hard to see how it advances any of the country’s core interests or even Trump’s own stated goals. Even so, NATO’s present problems predate Trump and are largely the result of long-term structural forces. In the absence of a common, clear, and present danger, sustaining an elaborate multinational alliance was always going to be difficult, and it is in some ways a testimony to past diplomatic artistry that NATO has kept going as long as it has and despite the failures in Afghanistan and Libya and the divisions that erupted over the war in Iraq. Even if Trump had stuck with the status quo, reaffirmed the U.S. commitment, and played nicely with Europe’s leaders, it would not have reversed the gradual erosion of the trans-Atlantic partnership. A better course would have been to start a gradual, constructive, and if possible amiable decrease of the U.S. security role in Europe, making it clear to U.S. allies that Washington no longer believed it needed to maintain a security presence there and that it planned to be either completely or nearly out in five to 10 years. The United States might conceivably remain a formal member of NATO, but it would no longer station forces there, no longer insist that the supreme allied commander in Europe be a U.S. officer, and no longer expect the Europeans to fall obediently into line whenever Washington barked orders. Trade, investment, and tourism would continue, and U.S. arms manufacturers would be free to sell to European buyers if these states decided to bolster their defenses. Meanwhile, the United States would be free to focus on other problems. Contrary to what you might think, I’m not anti-European, let alone anti-NATO. The alliance was a bold achievement for its time and one that served both the United States and Europe well in the past. But as I [wrote](https://nationalinterest.org/article/the-ties-that-fray-why-europe-and-america-are-drifting-apart-900) back in 1998: “[N]othing is permanent in international affairs, and NATO’s past achievements should not blind us to its growing fragility. Instead of mindlessly extending guarantees to every potential trouble spot, and instead of basing our foreign policy on a presumption of permanent partnership, it is time for Europe and the United States to begin a slow and gradual process of disengagement. This is going to happen anyway, and wise statecraft anticipates and exploits the tides of history rather than engaging in a fruitless struggle to hold them back.” It was true back then and is even truer today.

#### Key NATO allies in Europe’s trust of the US is depleting fast

**De Luce and Bradley, 20** (Dan De Luce, reporter for the NBC News Investigative Unit, and Matt Bradley, Foreign Correspondent for NBC News, “After Trump, foreign allies wonder whether they can trust America, say former officials,” November 15, 2020, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/after-trump-foreign-allies-wonder-if-they-can-trust-america-n1247715>) (NBOYLE/MSDI, Acc: 7-4-2022)

America's partners around the world are mostly relieved that the end of [Donald Trump](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/there-will-be-smooth-transition-second-trump-administration-claims-pompeo-n1247309)'s chaotic presidency is near, but they harbor lingering doubts about Washington's reliability and are wary of the country's polarized politics even under new leadership, former foreign and U.S. diplomats say. "There's a feeling that if it can happen once, it can happen again," said James Bindenagel, a retired career U.S. diplomat who is a senior professor at Bonn University in Germany. Although governments in Europe[s] and Asia in particular are reassured by [President-elect Joe Biden](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/would-biden-get-tough-china-n1239203)'s experience on the world stage and his vow to shore up U.S. alliances, their confidence in America's ability to deliver on its commitments has been deeply shaken, and Trump's departure won't automatically restore their faith, former diplomats said. Trump's imposition of tariffs and his talk of abandoning the NATO alliance, the foundation of trans-Atlantic ties, stunned Europeans. In talking to German officials, Bindenagel said the question he hears again and again is: "Can we trust the Americans?" As a result, Biden will have to do more than merely voice support for NATO and trans-Atlantic cooperation, Bindenagel said. "The question becomes: Can we re-establish trust? You can't do that overnight, and you can't do it with a declaration. You have to prove it," he said. Bindenagel said one way to begin to restore trust with European allies would be for Biden to reverse Trump's decision this year to withdraw 10,000 U.S. troops from Germany, a move that blindsided Berlin. Biden's team has said he will review the decision. Doubts about America's staying power predate Trump. Foreign ministries now see protectionist, populist currents as permanent features of the U.S. political landscape, with Americans increasingly questioning alliance arrangements, troop commitments and the benefits of global trade. According to a 2019 Pew Research Center survey, [46 percent of Americans said](https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/12/17/6-views-of-foreign-policy/) "we should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate more on problems here at home." When Trump lost the presidential election, "you could hear the biggest sigh of relief in human history," said [Kishore Mahbubani](http://www.nus.edu.sg/thought-leadership/-in-category/thoughtleaders/m/prof-kishore-mahbubani), Singapore's former ambassador to the United Nations and dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. But governments in Asia know that it's not possible to turn the clock back and that a deeply divided America can't guarantee that a deal reached today will still hold in four years when another president might take over, Mahbubani said. "That's the problem. That's why people will hedge their bets," he said. "There's a very high possibility that he [Trump] will get in again." Mahbubani also said American's struggle to contain the coronavirus has dented the country's image, making it look inept and incapable of managing its problems. Trump's refusal to concede defeat has also reinforced doubts about America's political health. Mindful of China's growing power, Southeast Asian countries would like Washington to rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the regional trade pact that was brokered by President Barack Obama and was promptly dumped by Trump in 2017. But they recognize that's unlikely given opposition to the trade deal in the U.S. on both the left and the right, Mahbubani said. Margot Wallström, Sweden's former foreign minister, said Biden will be widely welcomed in foreign capitals as a familiar figure who will work in cooperation with other countries on climate and other common threats. "We can relax a bit in Europe and the rest of the world, because this is a person we can talk to. And everything starts with that in diplomacy and in the multilateral context," said Wallström, who was Sweden's top diplomat from 2014 to 2019.

### Russia Divides NATO

#### Russia disrupts solvency by pitting NATO members against each other

Todd HelmusJanuary 2018 (Researcher at RAND Corporation), “Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe,” https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324480070\_Russian\_Social\_Media\_Influence\_Understanding\_Russian\_Propaganda\_in\_Eastern\_Europe (BGS-MSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

The literature review presented in this chapter provides context for Russian propaganda operations on social media, which are intertwined with Kremlin information operations via more-traditional media and other soft power elements.1 In the former Soviet states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus, the Kremlin aims to leverage shared elements of the post-Soviet experience in order to drive wedges between ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking populations and their host governments. Farther abroad, the Kremlin attempts to achieve policy paralysis by sowing confusion, stoking fears, and eroding trust in Western and democratic institutions.

### Sweden/Finland

#### Sweden and Finland’s power disrupts current balances within NATO – this damages alliance consensus and prevents the plan’s passage

Zachary Selden May 31, 2022 (Will Finland and Sweden Joining NATO Deepen the Alliance’s Problems?, https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/will-finland-and-sweden-joining-nato-deepen-the-alliances-problems/Zachary Selden was the deputy secretary general for policy at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly from 2008 to 2011 and the director of the Defence and Security Committee at the same institution from 2003 to 2007. He is currently an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida) (NEIGH/MSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

Clearly Sweden and Finland have decided that it is time to rock the boat. The fact that two non-aligned states in close proximity to Russia want to join NATO now has strategic implications, but — contrary to what most argue — enlarging the alliance to bring in these two states will change it much more than previous enlargements did. [Previous NATO enlargements](https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010613g.htm) were pitched as part of integrating the Central and Eastern European states into Western institutions, particularly the European Union, more than explicit protection against Russia. Sweden and Finland, however, are joining NATO solely for the American security commitment in the face of Russian aggression. This is likely to exacerbate tensions in the alliance between those members focused on building European strategic autonomy, particularly France, and those more concerned with maintaining a strong transatlantic security relationship heavily dependent on American military power. If Sweden and Finland were confident in the European Union’s ability to achieve meaningful strategic autonomy backed by military power, there would be no need to join NATO. Further, Sweden and Finland bring more financial and military assets to the table than the states in previous rounds of enlargement and will use that to shape NATO in their interests as much as possible. This is likely to lead to a greater NATO air and naval presence in the Baltic, as well as more of a NATO focus on the Arctic. On both points, Sweden and Finland will sit closer to the British position, which has particular political significance in the post-Brexit environment. Not All NATO Enlargements Are the Same Sweden and Finland are joining now because of their heightened [sense of vulnerability](https://time.com/6169708/finland-sweden-nato-expansion/) following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. What is not as obvious, perhaps, is that fear of Russian military action was not the main factor that drove many Central and Eastern European states to apply for NATO membership in the previous rounds of enlargement. [NATO has enlarged](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm) since the end of the Cold War at the request of aspirant states. In 1999, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia were brought into NATO. In 2004 the alliance formally approved the entry of countries that were previously part of the Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), as well as Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Albania and Croatia joined in 2009, and Montenegro and North Macedonia followed in 2017 and 2020. In all of these cases, accession was preceded by a lengthy process to bring each aspirant member up to certain standards. The question was not just military compatibility and capability, but also the strength and depth of democratic institutions. Each aspirant member went through a lengthy [Membership Action Plan](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37356.htm) process, in which progress was continually assessed in areas such as building an independent judiciary, establishing transparent election processes, and constructing a market-based economy. Much of this does not relate directly to the needs of a military alliance, but that only underscores that NATO is a political-military alliance. Many of the demands of the accession process dovetailed closely with the reforms undertaken by each of these countries in their quest for E.U. membership, which was precisely the point for most of these states. In the 2000s, E.U. membership was seen by many of these countries as the more significant prize and fulfilling the criteria for NATO membership was a means toward that end. Meeting the milestones set down in the Membership Action Plan was a way to establish progress toward completing the European Union’s [acquis communitaire](https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/acquis-communautaire), a much more voluminous package of reforms that must be voted into law by each applicant to the European Union. NATO membership was seen as a significant step forward on the path to E.U. membership, and the two were often discussed as part of a package leading to “[Euro-Atlantic integration](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/07/27/the-flip-side-of-euro-atlantic-integration/).” Security from Russian actions and territorial integrity were clearly priorities for the Baltic states, but most of the countries that have joined NATO over the past 20 years do not share a border with Russia and were [more concerned about their integration](https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB959244482836758541) into the European Union than any threat that Russia posed to them. It is worth remembering that when the “big bang” enlargement of NATO occurred in 2004, NATO and Russia had recently upgraded the relationship to form the [NATO-Russia Council](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm), Russia had a [full diplomatic mission at NATO headquarters](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm), and President Vladimir Putin was still widely viewed [as a reformer](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/apr/13/20040413-110503-4434r/). In short, most of the states that joined NATO between 1999 and 2020 lacked the financial and military resources to be significant contributors to the alliance’s military capabilities, and they were more concerned about integration into a broadly conceived West than their security from Russia military action. They had limited capability and incentive to use their political capital to shift the alliance in any significant manner — just being a member of the club fulfilled most of their goals. Finland and Sweden have little in common with the states that have joined NATO since the end of the Cold War. They are joining now solely to get a security guarantee backed by American military power. They are not new democracies seeking incorporation into European structures — rather they are highly developed market economies and longstanding members of the European Union. Their militaries and defense industrial bases are [superior to those of many NATO members](https://www.wdmma.org/ranking.php). As non-aligned states, they maintained their military capability after the end of the Cold War to a [degree that most other European states did not](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/for-finland-the-cold-war-never-ended-thats-why-its-ready-for-nato/). Those factors will affect their direct and indirect contributions to NATO and give them far more influence than the states that joined in previous enlargements. They bring significant financial and military resources to the table and likely will use that as leverage in NATO policy discussions. Finland’s and Sweden’s Interests and Influence [NATO is funded](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm) by direct financial contributions by the members and, far more importantly, by indirect contributions in terms of military personnel and equipment tasked by national authorities for NATO operations. As for [NATO’s common budgets](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/12/pdf/211216-CB_2022-ExecSum.pdf) (which are [distinct from national defense budgets](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm)), Finland and Sweden are likely to pay approximately 1.2 percent and 2.2 percent respectively, based on the formula that divides the costs among the members based on GDP. That may not be much compared to the U.S. share (16 percent), but it puts Sweden and Finland in the same category as Denmark. The real influence of Finland and Sweden, however, will come from their indirect contributions. Finland and Sweden are quite distinct in some ways (Finland, for example, [still maintains a conscription-based military](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/for-finland-the-cold-war-never-ended-thats-why-its-ready-for-nato/)), but both are better prepared than most NATO members to defend their territory as well as to deploy forces as part of missions out of the region. In fact, both were significant contributors to NATO missions prior to applying for membership, [particularly in the Balkans](https://www.foi.se/report-summary?reportNo=FOI-R--5060--SE). In sum, they are not likely to remain in the background in North Atlantic Council meetings, where the ambassadors from each member state meet to discuss NATO policy. NATO is an alliance of theoretically equal states operating by consensus, but those states with the capability to sustain significant forces as part of NATO missions have a weight in the room that those who cannot do so simply lack. How might this change NATO? First, there is likely to be a push for much more NATO focus on [the Baltic region](https://www.foi.se/en/foi/news-and-pressroom/news/2019-12-03-expect-russia-to-continue-throwing-its-military-weight-around-not-least-in-europe.html?openExpanderWith=military%2Ccapability%2Cpage). This is not new, and NATO has devoted particular attention to the region through ground troop deployments and exercises in [Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania](https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/02/nato-baltic-states-sea-russia-military-defense/). However, the alliance’s activities in this region are likely to become much more focused on maritime and aerial operations. While the small Baltic states rely on other NATO members for their air defense, Sweden and Finland have substantial and sophisticated air forces. Both countries are widely viewed as [punching well above their weight](https://www.wdmma.org/ranking.php) in terms of their ability to sustain an air campaign. With the addition of Sweden and Finland, the Baltic Sea effectively becomes a NATO lake. As such, the alliance’s military activities in and around the Baltic Sea will likely become deeply integrated with the territories and armed forces of Sweden and Finland, to include basing. Sweden and Finland will also likely drive [more attention to the Arctic region](https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/small-non-aligned-sweden-strategic-posture-arctic-part-i/) as a zone of competition with Russia. NATO has a longstanding interest in the “high North,” but competing concerns have generally relegated this to the back shelf in terms of NATO priorities. Yet, a wide range of military and non-military concerns revolve around the Arctic for all the countries involved, and it will not escape Sweden and Finland’s notice that, with their accession, every country on the Arctic Council will also be a NATO member except Russia. The Arctic will likely become much more of a central issue for NATO, and this may exacerbate some tensions in the alliance. France, for example, is generally a proponent of a more Mediterranean focus for the alliance. NATO is obviously capable of doing both, but the balance shifts toward a northerly geographic focus with the addition of two more Arctic states. Sweden and Finland’s geographic interests will align more closely with those of the United Kingdom than those of France. In the post-Brexit environment, this will likely heighten tensions in the alliance between those who favor a strong transatlantic relationship and those who seek to raise the prominence of the European Union as a security actor under the rubric of “[strategic](https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/washington-should-help-europe-achieve-strategic-autonomy-not-fight-it/) [autonomy](https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/europes-defense-debate-is-all-about-america/).” France is a longstanding leader on this issue and President Emmanuel Macron has recently used France’s term as the rotating president of the Council of the European Union to push for [strategic autonomy](https://diplomatist.com/2022/01/18/the-idea-of-strategic-autonomy-as-pushed-by-emmanuel-macron-key-to-eus-strategic-performance/). By applying for NATO membership now, Sweden and Finland are signaling where they stand in that debate. Once again, their motivation for joining NATO now is to pull themselves into a formal security relationship with the United States. Keep in mind that both are E.U. members and that the European Union has a mutual defense clause as part of the [Lisbon Treaty](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/5/the-treaty-of-lisbon). If ensuring Sweden and Finland’s security were seen in Helsinki and Stockholm as a goal that could be met through the European Union and greater European security autonomy, there would be no need to join NATO. Both clearly want to be part of a security arrangement backed by American power. As a recent [report from the Swedish Defence Institute](https://www.foi.se/report-summary?reportNo=FOI-R--5013--SE) makes clear, Sweden sees the United States as the only power capable of guaranteeing European security, not the European Union or its members based on their collective military capability. This is clearly at odds with France’s drive for greater European security autonomy. Every NATO enlargement changes the alliance, but adding Sweden and Finland will be more transformative than previous rounds. Sweden and Finland bring significant capabilities and resources to the table that will be a welcome addition to the alliance. But these capabilities give them influence that can be expected to further shift NATO’s focus to the Baltic and Arctic regions. At the same time, Sweden and Finland’s accession may heighten longstanding tensions in the alliance, particularly with France. It will require a deft diplomatic hand to balance priorities and maintain alliance solidarity in what promises to be a challenging period in the transatlantic relationship and European security.

#### Finland and Sweden membership threatens the health of the entire alliance – NATO cannot agree with a plan that perpetuates the risk of going nuclear

Jonas Gratzer June 29th, 2022 (The US. Is Welcoming Finland and Sweden to NATO. That’s a Mistake; <https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/turkey-sweden-finland-nato-membership-is-bad-for-us-rcna35786>; Daniel L. Davis is a senior fellow for Defense Priorities and a former lieutenant colonel in the Army who was deployed into combat zones four times. He is the author of “[The Eleventh Hour in 2020 America](https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.amazon.com/dp/B08KHGDQRK__;!!PIZeeW5wscynRQ!qPDKk56pTlhK6eYU59NxmP4WzOR57526A_vM-RvX7rWezdUZaGhVPfOjyqc7mbG_1Ck7owun76jrCB3Sqm4QO0UpSY8PRRczeSQ$). Cutby:neigh)

When [NATO alliance members](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/biden-announce-extension-us-troop-presence-poland-rcna35587?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=dfn-ebb) meet in Madrid this week, one of the featured agenda items is Finland and Sweden’s request to officially join the alliance. The NATO leadership has welcomed their ascension, with Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg saying the two countries’ “membership in NATO would increase our shared security.” Though [member state Turkey](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/turkey-lifts-objections-finland-sweden-joining-nato-rcna35772) originally signaled it objected to the idea, it lifted its opposition after a breakthrough on Tuesday that clears the way for the Nordic states. While enlarging NATO might seem like a wise thing to do in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it doesn’t take much sober analysis to conclude that adding yet more NATO members is likely to have the opposite effect of what the secretary general hopes. Instead of lowering the chances of war, the membership of Finland and Sweden would increase the risk of future conflict for the entire alliance; adding two more triggers for Article 5 — the provision in the NATO charter that stipulates that an attack on one is an attack on all — would add to the risk of war for the entire alliance. That would be an unwise course in any case, but it’s particularly ill-advised given that it would make Finland and Sweden more vulnerable, as well. Russia poses no realistic threat to Sweden or Finland. Since World War II, Russia hasn’t exhibited the slightest interest in territorial acquisition in either country, and in fact, [Finland and Russia were on friendly terms](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/brief-history-finlands-swedens-strained-ties-with-russia-2022-05-12/) during the Cold War. In contrast, Russia was consistently and emphatically clear [for 15 years](https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/03/putins-blood-war-in-ukraine-was-15-years-in-the-making/) that it regarded any NATO expansion along its border in either Ukraine or Georgia as an existential threat that it would use force to prevent — and in fact has done so twice ([Georgia 2008](https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/warontherocks.com/2018/08/the-august-war-ten-years-on-a-retrospective-on-the-russo-georgian-war/__;!!PIZeeW5wscynRQ!qPDKk56pTlhK6eYU59NxmP4WzOR57526A_vM-RvX7rWezdUZaGhVPfOjyqc7mbG_1Ck7owun76jrCB3Sqm4QO0UpSY8PcIs_LAE$) and [Ukraine 2014](https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.vox.com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know__;!!PIZeeW5wscynRQ!qPDKk56pTlhK6eYU59NxmP4WzOR57526A_vM-RvX7rWezdUZaGhVPfOjyqc7mbG_1Ck7owun76jrCB3Sqm4QO0UpSY8PZlgjSgQ$)). Thus Georgia and Ukraine had reason to fear a Russian attack. Finland and Sweden don’t. Extending NATO membership to these two countries wouldn’t only burden the U.S., which would be expected to go to war on behalf of these two Nordic states if they are attacked. It would saddle Helsinki and Stockholm with troubles, as well. Up to now, if a war ever broke out between NATO and Russia, both Finland and Sweden would have been protected by their neutral status. If membership were extended to both, that protection would be gone. If the two became NATO members and the alliance went to war with Russia in the future, both countries would be thrust almost immediately into an armed conflict whether they wanted to be or not — and even if their national interests weren’t otherwise threatened. Given their status as NATO members, the Kremlin would almost certainly attack airfields and ports in both countries to prevent other allies from using their facilities to stage attacks against Russia. But there is an even more fundamental reason to oppose expanding the alliance at present: It isn’t needed. Russia has exposed itself as being [shockingly weak](https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.eurasiareview.com/24022022-russian-weakness-and-the-russian-threat-to-the-west-oped/__;!!PIZeeW5wscynRQ!qPDKk56pTlhK6eYU59NxmP4WzOR57526A_vM-RvX7rWezdUZaGhVPfOjyqc7mbG_1Ck7owun76jrCB3Sqm4QO0UpSY8PZ3foZN8$) in conventional military power, and it is now clear, beyond any question, that Russian ground forces don’t even possess the capacity to invade the NATO alliance. It isn’t entirely clear that Moscow will be able to capture the entirety of [the Donbas region](https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/05/why-russia-has-failed-to-win-the-battle-for-donbas/), in the single country of Ukraine, directly on its border. Russia is constrained in its ability to project power beyond its country by [systemic flaws](https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/feeding-the-bear-a-closer-look-at-russian-army-logistics/) in its logistics system. It is very difficult to get supplies beyond more than 180 miles away and virtually impossible beyond that without dedicated rail links. It is understandable that people who live near Russia would be afraid that one day Russia might invade them as it invaded Ukraine, and that, no doubt, led Sweden and Finland to make a sudden U-turn on their long-held preferences for neutrality. But an unemotional evaluation of their neighborhood shows their fears are misplaced. Sweden and Finland are at no clearer risk of an attack from Moscow than they have been for the past 70 years. Though the U.S. has also recently shown itself [eager to expand the alliance to these countries](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-meets-heads-finland-sweden-show-support-nato-membership-rcna29621), the accession of Sweden and, especially, Finland could hardly be said to further the American national interest. Finland shares a roughly 800-mile border with Russia that NATO would be committed to defend, and this defense — or the stationing of NATO military infrastructure in Finland — would risk antagonizing Russia. Washington should at least be clear that if Finland becomes a NATO member, it expects that the Europeans would be tasked with defending Finland’s border, as the U.S. itself is already [doing too much](https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/burden-shifting-to-fix-outdated-alliances__;!!PIZeeW5wscynRQ!qPDKk56pTlhK6eYU59NxmP4WzOR57526A_vM-RvX7rWezdUZaGhVPfOjyqc7mbG_1Ck7owun76jrCB3Sqm4QO0UpSY8PBMc5CCE$) for the defense of wealthy and capable European countries. None of this is to say that Russia doesn’t pose a danger to Europe, however. It does. But the nature of the threat isn’t conventional military power; it’s the massive [Russian nuclear arsenal](https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf__;!!PIZeeW5wscynRQ!qPDKk56pTlhK6eYU59NxmP4WzOR57526A_vM-RvX7rWezdUZaGhVPfOjyqc7mbG_1Ck7owun76jrCB3Sqm4QO0UpSY8PygjRBRk$) that could nearly wipe out the U.S. and Europe in an [Armageddon-type scenario](https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.washingtonpost.com/business/putins-nuclear-threat-is-terrifying-even-if-hes-bluffing/2022/02/27/5ce6cbbc-9817-11ec-9987-9dceee62a3f6_story.html__;!!PIZeeW5wscynRQ!qPDKk56pTlhK6eYU59NxmP4WzOR57526A_vM-RvX7rWezdUZaGhVPfOjyqc7mbG_1Ck7owun76jrCB3Sqm4QO0UpSY8P0HEQ0Po$). Author Harry Kazianis participated in a 2019 U.S. government exercise in which NATO and Russia eventually came to nuclear blows during a Ukraine war scenario — and the study predicted that at least [1 billion people](https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/thefederalist.com/2022/03/04/nato-involvement-in-ukraine-could-spark-nuclear-genocide-heres-how-it-could-happen/__;!!PIZeeW5wscynRQ!qPDKk56pTlhK6eYU59NxmP4WzOR57526A_vM-RvX7rWezdUZaGhVPfOjyqc7mbG_1Ck7owun76jrCB3Sqm4QO0UpSY8PblBmhTA$) would be killed in the ensuing exchange (no matter who fired the first shot). significantly threaten NATO in its current composition, and Finland and Sweden are under no apparent threat from Moscow if they remain outside the alliance — while the risk of nuclear escalation if they join could destroy our country and theirs. The U.S. has a great incentive to resist the knee-jerk emotional desire to expand NATO at this time. The risk to our national security is great, while the benefit is nonexistent.

### Ukraine Policy

#### Biden confirms NATO tension over Ukraine

Patrick Wintour 1/20/2022, diplomatic editor for The Guardian, “Biden lays bare Nato divide over Russia aggression against Ukraine”, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/20/biden-lays-bare-nato-divisions-over-russia-aggression-in-ukraine, (MDOCK/MSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

Joe Biden confirmed at his press conference on Wednesday what has been apparent for weeks – Nato remains divided over how to respond to Russian aggression against Ukraine. His admission of a split was overshadowed by his passing remark that a minor incursion would be treated differently to a full-scale invasion. The White House afterwards clarified that a minor incursion meant cyber-attacks, as opposed to a movement of Russian troops into Ukraine sovereign territory. None of this is academic since Biden said he thought Vladimir Putin would risk an invasion, however much Nato tried to change the Russian president’s calculus with threats. The greatest tension over the correct response is between the US and Germany, hence the visit of the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, to Berlin on Thursday before a meeting with Russian officials in Geneva. Some of the differences are manageable. Neither of the two main sides of the German coalition are willing to sell arms to Ukraine, saying it is longstanding German policy, based on its war experience, not to send weapons into a conflict zone. The current vice-chancellor, Robert Habeck, caused a storm last year when he suggested, against that policy, that the Greens might provide defensive arms, but he beat a fast retreat. By contrast the US, the UK and Turkey do supply arms. Critics point out that the underlying morality guiding Germany’s approach to arms exports is opaque. According to government figures released on Monday, sales to Egypt boosted Germany’s arms exports to record levels in 2021. Preliminary figures from the Economic Affairs and Climate Action Ministry showed Germany exported arms worth €9.35bn (£7.79bn/$10.65bn) last year – 61% up on 2020. This leaves open the question of why it is acceptable to sell arms to a repressive regime, such as Egypt, but not to a country seeking to avoid repression, such as Ukraine. On the issue of energy dependency, the tensions are deeper. A compromise reached last summer between the US and Angela Merkel, reaffirmed this week by her successor as chancellor, Olaf Scholz, implies that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline built to carry gas from Russia to Germany will be affected if an invasion happens. In the absence of an invasion, the Greens and the Social Democrats (SPD) have for now parked their differences by waiting to see if the pipeline receives regulatory approval in Germany and the EU. The SPD want it to go ahead and the Greens do not, but the German approach – not just in the SDP, the home of detente – may be shifting. A letter from more than 73 eastern Europe security experts in Die Zeit urged Germany to end its three-decade policy of standing by in the face of Russian aggression. Solely in deference to Germany, Biden has worked hard with Democratic senators to prevent them backing sanctions now, but the issue is still live in US politics, and patience with Germany among Republicans is thin. Separately there has been a dispute about whether Russia can be detached from SWIFT, the international payments system. Some of this is a technical dispute about the legality and effectiveness of the action, and voices do not all go one way. Katarina Barley, a vice-president of the European parliament and member of Germany’s Social Democrats, for instance, is a supporter. But the fact that the EU does not want to meet formally to discuss sanctions in advance suggests it wants to avoid a row. The risks of fracture stretch beyond individual punishments to the wider principle of the extent to which the EU should be running an independent Russia policy. The Americans have undoubtedly made strenuous efforts to involve European capitals. But on Wednesday the French president, Emmanuel Macron, once again raised the principle of not just an independent EU security policy, but explicitly an independent European policy towards Russia – something he has proposed before, to little effect in Moscow. His proposal blindsided the European commission and led to frantic reassuring calls to the Americans. This is a familiar French refrain, but if the US finds it dispiriting, it should review the wisdom of going behind France’s back to sign the Aukus nuclear submarine deal to confront China in September, leaving France humiliated. In diplomacy, loyalty has to be earned, not just demanded.

#### Ukraine splits path of NATO

Steven Erlanger and Michael Crowley, April 6 2022, chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times and diplomatic correspondent in the Washington bureau, NATO Nations See Differing Paths as Ukraine War Enters Uncertain Stage,https://www.nytimes.com/2 022/04/06/world/europe/nato-ukraine-russia.html, (MDOCK/MSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

Faced with the prospect that the war in Ukraine will be long and grinding, NATO countries are divided on how best to manage the next stage of the conflict and the uncertain period that promises to follow. Central European members like Poland and the Baltic states want a total break with Moscow and an effort to bring Russia to its knees, two senior Western officials said. They worry that anything that Russia can present as a victory will do serious damage to European security. But other nations believe that Russia cannot be easily subdued and that the war’s outcome is likely to be messy — more exhausting cease-fire than resounding victory. Countries like France, Germany and Turkey want to keep contacts with Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, regardless of the allegations of war crimes committed by his troops, the officials said. NATO foreign ministers, meeting this week to discuss how to help Ukraine prosecute the war, do agree on one major point: The war is far from over and — as badly as Russia’s forces have performed and despite their retreat from areas around Kyiv, the capital — they are making slow and brutal progress in Ukraine’s east. “Moscow is not giving up its ambitions in Ukraine,” Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s secretary general, said this week. “We now see a significant movement of troops away from Kyiv, to regroup, rearm and resupply. And they shift their focus to the east.” That will take several weeks, officials believe, as Russian troops move back into Belarus to be resupplied and reorganized, and then must make their way with their equipment through Russia toward eastern Ukraine. Image The site where one woman’s body was found, very close to where six civilians from the village had been buried in a mass grave in a forest in Motyzhyn, Ukraine, on Tuesday.Credit...Daniel Berehulak for The New York Times “In the coming weeks, we expect a further Russian push in the eastern and southern Ukraine to try to take the entire Donbas and to create a land bridge to occupied Crimea,” Mr. Stoltenberg said. “This is a crucial phase of the war.” In response to the scenes of corpses in Bucha, the United States and the European Union are preparing more sanctions against Russia, but without much expectation that they will hasten the end of the war. But at the NATO meetings, the talk will be of weapons and matériel, not sanctions. There is a general agreement that Russia is no longer a strategic partner of the alliance, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is no longer bound by the troop limits of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, and that its military posture must be sharply enhanced to deter a confrontational Russia, so long as Mr. Putin and his allies retain power there.

#### NATO tensions raised over Russia-Ukriane

Anurag Roushan, 04/7/2022, political writer for Republicworld.com, NATO Countries Divided Over Maintaining Relations With Russia Amid Ukraine War: Reporthttps://www.republicworld.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-crisis/nato-countries-divided-over-maintaining-relations-with-russia-amid-ukraine-war-report-articleshow.htm, (MDOCK/MSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

As the war in Eastern Europe continues to escalate, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries are divided into two camps on the issue of relations with Russia. While Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia push for a complete split with Russia, Germany, France, and Turkey intend to keep in touch with Russian officials regardless of the situation in Ukraine and the alleged war crimes committed by Russian troops, The New York Times reported quoting Western officials.

The NATO foreign ministers' meeting this week, to discuss ways to assist Ukraine in prosecuting Russia, agreed on one main point - the war is far from over - and despite their withdrawal from areas around Kyiv, Russian troops are making gradual progress in Ukraine's east, the report added. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that Moscow has no intention of abandoning its ambitions in Ukraine. He also stated that there is currently a large movement of Russian troops away from Kyiv to reorganise, rearm, and resupply and they are shifting their focus to the eastern region. "We expect a renewed Russian drive in eastern and southern Ukraine in the coming weeks, with the goal of capturing the entire Donbass and establishing a land bridge to occupied Crimea. This is a crucial phase of the conflict," the NATO chief added. Ukraine shares draft security guarantee with NATO & non-NATO nations amid war with RussiaAs per The New York Times report, NATO is committed to providing all kinds of help to Ukraine and around two-thirds of the alliance's members have already provided lethal weaponry, including the Czech Republic's supply of Soviet-era tanks and armoured personnel carriers. The Czech Republic became the first NATO member to send tanks and Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) to Ukraine. According to reports, this was the first such shipment of heavy weapons to the besieged ex-Soviet country since the Russian invasion began on February 24. 91% of Ukrainians want to join EU as support for NATO membership continues to declineMeanwhile, European Union diplomats failed to approve a new sanctions package against Russia which was proposed by the European Commission on Wednesday, April 6. Reportedly, the sanctions package could not get approval owing to disagreements over the coal embargo. However, the bloc has withdrawn Russia's "most-favoured-nation" trade status, which allows EU countries to impose punitive levies on Russian trade and commerce.

### Turkey-Sanctions

#### Turkey F-35 removal undermines NATO effectiveness

Heather A. Conley, 7-17-2020, senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Rachel Ellehuus is deputy director and senior fellow with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-nato-can-avoid-strategic-decoupling-eastern-mediterranean, "How NATO Can Avoid a Strategic Decoupling in the Eastern Mediterranean," Center for Strategic and International Studies (ermo/sms, Acc:7-4-2022)

The Risk of a Mediterranean Strategic Decoupling

Since the incident, tensions between Turkey and France have escalated as both presidents have used very strong rhetoric against the other. Although it might be tempting to hope that tensions will fade, they are likely to escalate again and have major implications for the European Union, NATO, and the rule of law.

First, tensions have now reached a level where they risk significantly impacting NATO. Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 system against the wishes of the United States and its NATO allies, its unilateral military interventions into Syria against Kurdish forces, its frequent military interventions into northern Iraq (its most recent air and ground operation was in mid-June), its violations of Iran (and likely Venezuela) sanctions, its continued probing of Greek airspace, and its recent veto over important NATO plans for the defense of NATO’s eastern flank (which was suddenly lifted days after the naval incident) leads one to conclude that Turkey is increasingly pursuing its national interests over NATO’s collective defense interests. The decision by the United States and other F-35 program partners to remove Turkey from the program (although it continues to contribute to the supply chain) will diminish NATO defenses in general as well as its readiness, interoperability, and effectiveness of NATO’s air defense capabilities. Likewise, the announcement of France’s withdrawal of its forces from NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian following the naval incident with Turkey reduces much-needed naval capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean for both the European Union and NATO to jointly enforce the UN arms embargo in Libya.

#### Turkey is eroding NATO cohesion and security and disagreements inevitable

FederigaBrindi, IanBond, Heather Conley ( foreign policy directors from Center for European Reform) “Is Turkey Damaging NATO” last modified Jan 24, 2018 <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/75345> (ESIEVER/MSDI, Acc: 7-4-2022)

Yes, it is. In Afrin, Turkish forces have launched a ground offensive against U.S.-backed Syrian-Kurdish militia. In other words, Turkey is indirectly attacking its main NATO ally. It is doing so with Russian support, as Moscow controls the skies in the area—the last act in the rapprochement between the two countries since the 2015 crisis. Western powers have timidly pleaded with Ankara to show restraint. At an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council called by France, ambassadors met behind closed doors. They did not publicly condemn Turkey for its actions. Nor there has been enough condemnation by Western allies of the repeated human rights violations by Turkey over the last few years.Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has essentially been given the all-clear to do what he wants, knowing that Ankara’s NATO allies (not to mention the EU) will look the other way. The problem with such irresponsible behavior is that it is not only damaging NATO, it is undermining the whole Western community—and its values system. The respect of fundamental rights is what the West has used to justify the last two decades of wars;the damage is soon going to be irreparable. Turkey is causing an increasing amount of damage to NATO. Ankara has reason for concern about U.S. support for the Kurdish YPG fighters in Syria, given the YPG’s link to the PKK terrorist group inside Turkey; but allied security will not benefit from Turkey attacking one of the only forces in Syria that can consistently fight and win against the so-called Islamic State. Only Bashar al Assad and IS would gain from the defeat of the YPG. And if Turkey’s action in Syria is at least explicable, what was Erdoğan thinking when he decided to buy a long-range air defense system from Russia rather than from a NATO ally? The alliance will end up with a significant gap in coverage on its south-eastern flank. But Turkey’s drift away from democracy and the rule of law damages the alliance more fundamentally than any individual action. After more than a decade of rating Turkey as “partly free,” Freedom House downgraded the country to “not free” this year. During the Cold War, NATO held its nose and tolerated authoritarian regimes in allied countries (including Turkey). These days, shared democratic values glue NATO together. Turkey’s behavior puts that unity at risk. Turkey’s recent brinkmanship policies have definitely damaged the cohesion of NATO and the current Afrin incursion has the potential to widen the gap. However unwise Turkey’s latest move might be, it does not come as a surprise. It is not enough that the United States recognized Turkey’s legitimate security concerns along the northern Syrian border only after the Afrin offensive. Make no mistake: there are many things that Turkey is to blame for—including, in large part, for not peacefully resolving the Kurdish question. A solution might have allowed Turkey to agree to some sort of face-saving agreement with the Kurdish YPG in Syria. But if there is one thing that Washington and Ankara have in common, it’s a miscalculated Syria policy—and the current situation is the direct outcome of that. Both the United States and Turkey now face a larger question: are their long-term goals in Syria attainable? For the Turks, the incursion not only creates security risks at home (PKK terror attacks in major Turkish cities had stopped since 2016, but may very well return); it also risks serving Moscow’s agenda to drive a wedge into NATO. President Erdoğan’s agenda may be fuelled by strong survival instincts and paranoia, but even outside his circles suspicion against NATO runs deep. It does not take much to make the case for alternative alliances. Turkey has reached a point where the government might be willing to risk damaging NATO for what it sees as preserving Turkey’s sovereignty, even if this may come at a high price.Any NATO member that purposefully diminishes its democratic principles and institutions damages the alliance. Every NATO member is a signatory to the alliance’s founding document, the 1949 Washington Treaty, and its preamble states that all members are “… determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” Although we associate NATO solely with its military operations, NATO is a political-military alliance with democratic principles at its core. Turkey has so greatly diminished its democracy over the past several years that an independent U.S. organization, Freedom House, has recently declared the country “not free.” Unfortunately, Turkey is not a NATO outlier in this regard but is part of a growing trend. Poland, Hungary, and Romania are also actively diminishing judicial independence, institutional transparency, and the ability to express political opposition; the very essence of democracy. These countries also damage the credibility of this crucial political alliance.

But as a critical NATO member, Turkey’s military interventions in the Middle East—whether it is the shooting down of a Russian military aircraft or repeated unilateral military interventions in Iraq and Syria—increasingly place Turkey’s national security at risk, which places NATO at risk of becoming involved in the broader regional conflict. Thus, Turkey inflicts ongoing damage to NATO politically and militarily.

#### Turkey sanctions gut solvency

Arab News, 7-7-2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1701071/middle-east, "Tensions between Turkey, France pose threat to NATO alliance, warn experts," (TheoMSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system has also angered some NATO members over concerns it could undermine Western defense systems and led to Turkey’s expulsion from the alliance’s F-35 stealth fighter jet program.

### Turkey–Doctrine

#### Turkey Blue Homeland policy will undermine NATO effectiveness

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Turkey’s Blue Homeland Ambitions

Turkey’s Blue Homeland Doctrine has its origins in a plan drawn up by Turkish admiral Cem Gurdeniz in 2006. It sets out an ambitious goal to underline and expand, through assertive diplomacy and military means, Turkey’s influence in the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Seas while enabling access to energy and other economic resources. President Erdogan adopted it in 2015 as an integral part of a national strategy of “forward defense” in the context of his sustained drive to assert Turkish independence in all aspects of foreign policy to include influence in its surrounding regions.

Manifestations of the doctrine were on full display during the February 2019 Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland) exercise, which was the largest combat exercise since the establishment of the Turkish Navy and was conducted simultaneously in the Aegean, Black, and Eastern Mediterranean Seas. The Turkish government-controlled media described the exercise as a “war rehearsal.” Another example has been Turkey’s assertive energy claims around the disputed Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In February 2018, Turkey sent naval vessels to stop an Italian drilling vessel on its way to drill for gas off Cyprus’ coast. Then in the spring of 2019, Ankara sent ships into Cypriot waters, escorted by the Turkish navy, to conduct its own drilling activities. European Union member states unanimously denounced those “illegal actions,” expressed their support for Cyprus by restricting EU pre-accession aid to Turkey, and suspended negotiations of an air transport agreement. Israel also encountered Turkey’s naval activism when its oceanographic ship, Bat Galim, operating in Cypriot waters in cooperation with Nicosia, was forced out by Turkish warships. Regional tensions reached a new high in November 2019 when Turkey signed an agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord. The agreement defines a maritime border between the two countries in the Mediterranean Sea and permits Turkey to defend Libya’s maritime interests (which extend to six nautical miles from Crete) as well as allowing for joint extraction of energy resources in the Mediterranean.

To date, Turkey has met little resistance from either the European Union, NATO, or the United States in response to its actions, with the exception of harsh words and limited sanctions. Some EU parliamentarians have denounced Ankara’s “gunboat diplomacy,” and EU high representative Borrell released a declaration stating that EU countries are “growing increasingly concerned about the recent escalations from Turkey.” EU foreign affairs ministers convened on July 13, asking Ankara to provide “clarifications” on its actions in the Eastern Mediterranean, Libya, and Syria and asking High Representative Borrell to provide options to reinforce the sanctions imposed on Turkey for its gas and oil drilling activities in Cyprus’ EEZ. Secretary of State Pompeo has called Turkey’s illegal drilling in Cypriot waters “unacceptable,” yet this is unlikely to be followed by concrete action given that the Trump administration has not yet imposed legally mandated sanctions on Turkey for its purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system.

This lack of a holistic and united transatlantic response to Turkey’s naval actions has emboldened Ankara to take further actions, particularly at a time when Erdogan seeks to project independent power abroad and heighten nationalistic sentiment at home to distract the Turkish population from great economic difficulties. The restoration of Hagia Sophia as a mosque is a powerful example of this policy in action coupled with its military interventions in Libya and Syria. Absent international resolution of the Cypriot and Libyan disputes (which are on the cusp of bringing in other powers, such as Egypt and Israel), President Erdogan has (rightly) concluded that Turkey has more to gain by its unilateral use of hard power and reaching its own diplomatic agreements that suits its needs rather than through broader diplomatic engagement and dialogue.

#### Turkey won’t abide by NATO norms – no solvency

Arab News, 7-7-2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1701071/middle-east, "Tensions between Turkey, France pose threat to NATO alliance, warn experts," (TheoMSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

“Turkey’s government has begun to violate international norms by breaking an arms embargo on the Libyan conflict and invading northern Syria, backing extremist groups, and bombing northern Iraq.

“Ankara has tried to strong-arm NATO into supporting it through threats to hold up a Baltic defense plan and also through threatening and insulting other NATO members.

“Turkey insinuated to the US that Turkey would brush US forces aside in Syria in 2019 if the US didn’t leave, it has escalated conflicts rather than reducing them, and threatened to send refugees to Greece while staking counter claims to the Mediterranean against Greek claims,” he added.

### Turkey-France

#### France-Turkey tensions undermine NATO effectiveness

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Since an extraordinary naval standoff occurred between French and Turkish warships in the Eastern Mediterranean in early June, Paris and Ankara have been trading increasingly sharp verbal blows over their respective actions in implementing the UN arms embargo on Libya. While this may appear to be just another moment of friction between NATO allies, particularly with Turkey, it is not. This incident represents a more deep-seated strategic dilemma for NATO as well as an increasingly stark divide between the European Union and Turkey.

This strategic dilemma is rooted in Turkey’s new regional foreign and security policy, based in part on its “Blue Homeland” doctrine. The implementation of this doctrine has caused a series of serious incidents that have been observed by Turkey’s allies but fleetingly, if rarely, addressed. Encountering little resistance, Turkey believes its actions to be largely accepted (as some are, such as limiting Russian influence). But the totality of Turkey’s policies and actions have now reached a point of dangerous escalation, which could substantially challenge the coherence of NATO’s collective defense posture in the Mediterranean and weaken its political cohesion. Turkey’s actions threaten to hinder vital NATO-EU cooperation in the region as well.

To avoid this, allies should approach the growing instability in the Mediterranean through an integrative policy that seeks to deescalate tensions and define, with Ankara, common interests by identifying some agreed principles to guide regional behavior. If Turkey is unwilling to join such an initiative, greater transatlantic tensions lie ahead.

#### France & Turkey

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 4-12-2019, , former NATO Secretary-General (2009-2014):

https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/what-security-minds-think-about-natos-past-and-future/, "What security minds think about NATO's past and future," euractiv (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)

“The Transatlantic Alliance still needs NATO. The US’ allies are its greatest global competitive advantage, and Europe cannot reproduce the strength of NATO. In an increasingly dangerous world, we cannot go it alone.

However, keeping the London summit on the rails will not be an easy task. President Trump could fixate on defence spending and disrupt procedures as he did in Brussels last year. President Macron could repeat doubts about the certainty of Article 5, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy about the future of the Alliance; or Erdogan could continue to test NATO’s unity.

“Militarily, NATO is stronger than at any time since the Cold War. Defence spending in Europe has increased year-on-year since 2015. However, NATO is also a political organisation and the creeping doubts of some of its leading states’ Presidents undermine the Alliance. I believe the London summit will need to have some robust discussions, but the end result should be a clear statement that the security relationship overrides all other policy disagreements we may have.“

#### France-Turkey tensions undermine cooperation

Arab News, 7-7-2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1701071/middle-east, "Tensions between Turkey, France pose threat to NATO alliance, warn experts," (TheoMSDI, Acc:7-4-2022)

Paris’ recent decision to suspend its involvement in the NATO Sea Guardian maritime security operation in the eastern Mediterranean following an incident between a French frigate and Turkish vessels, has highlighted the organization’s difficulties in maintaining order and harmony among its members.

Months of escalating dispute between France and Turkey came to a head on June 10, when Paris claimed that its La Fayette-class Frigate Courbet was targeted three times by Turkish Navy fire control radars while it was trying to approach a Tanzanian-flagged civilian cargo ship suspected of trafficking arms to Libya.

### Turkey-EU

#### EU-Turkey tensions undermine solvency

Heather A. Conley, 7-17-2020, senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Rachel Ellehuus is deputy director and senior fellow with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-nato-can-avoid-strategic-decoupling-eastern-mediterranean, "How NATO Can Avoid a Strategic Decoupling in the Eastern Mediterranean," Center for Strategic and International Studies (ermo/sms, Acc:7-4-2022)

Second, these tensions reveal troubling divergences between Turkey and the European Union. From the EU perspective, Ankara’s aggressive pursuit of energy interests, disregard for the rule of law within Turkey (which should concern NATO as well), and use of migrants to pressure the European Union and destabilize the European neighborhood are at odds with EU values and interests. In the case of Cyprus, the European Union cannot be an unbiased actor. It supports its member state Cyprus and its ability to advance its economic interests within its EEZ according to international law, as the European Union would with any country elsewhere in the world. And while Turkey is free to pursue its national interests at the expense of collective European interests, its actions move it away from a more constructive partnership or strengthened economic ties with the European Union. And a more problematic EU-Turkey relationship further complicates conflict resolution efforts in the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and the Caucasus.

### Spending Gaps

#### NATO spending is insufficient to address issues

Max Bergmann and Sierra Cicarelli, 1-13-2021, "NATO’s Financing Gap," Center for American Progress, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/natos-financing-gap/> (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 7-3-2022)

In 2014, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea, NATO leaders met in Wales for a critical summit. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially following 9/11, the alliance had shifted its focus from its traditional mission of defending Europe to operations abroad. Meanwhile, NATO members significantly reduced defense spending, downsized their forces, and underinvested in modernizing their forces following the Cold War. However, Russian aggression against Ukraine shook the alliance; NATO leaders agreed in Wales that defending Europe would be a top priority and committed to spending at least 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense by 2024.1 This pledge was seen as a massive step forward for the alliance, as it would serve to address a growing gap in its capabilities. Since the summit, some progress has been made in strengthening the alliance. NATO members have increased defense spending, deployed forces in Central and Eastern Europe, and begun investing in needed capabilities. In 2019, almost all NATO allies increased their defense spending, with nine countries hitting the 2 percent goal.2 Most allies have put plans in place to substantially increase defense spending by 2024.3 The alliance is stronger and better prepared to deter Russia than it was six years ago, despite the divisive approach of President Donald Trump, but significant gaps remain. Marginal spending increases by various NATO members were inherently fragmented and often yielded few new major capabilities or failed to address some of NATO’s serious shortfalls. Meanwhile, many member states still have yet to adequately invest in their forces, leading to very low states of readiness and operational strain. Lack of progress **toward the 2 percent** benchmark has also caused major diplomatic tension within the alliance between the countries meeting their commitments and those that are not.4 Now, with the COVID-19 crisis hammering the balance sheets of all NATO members, the prospect for European defense spending looks bleak.5 It seems unlikely that there will be significant new investment to address some of NATO’s critical capability gaps. Indeed, the European Union—which had planned to increase funding to upgrade the dual-use infrastructure critical to moving NATO forces—has reduced its planned allocations in its recent budget.6 NATO members seeking to keep their economies alive are unlikely to prioritize defense. This is a serious problem for the alliance, and NATO needs to think more creatively about how to support continued alliance investment in the wake of the massive economic contraction caused by COVID-19. Simply demanding that countries spend more on defense, which was not very effective prepandemic, will certainly not work now. What has become apparent is that NATO’s default focus on individual nation-state spending commitments was doing little to address alliancewide issues. Collectively, European NATO members spend as much on defense as Russia, yet the disaggregated and loosely coordinated spending by individual states means that the alliance’s combat strength is well short of what it could be and has left critical gaps in its capabilities.

#### NATO’s spending goals don’t translate to defensive capabilities

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As the Secretary General’s Annual Report for 2018 makes clear, NATO has many productive initiatives underway that focus on its real security needs, and that will help deter Russia and deal with the key issues in its military readiness and force planning. In fact, some 90% of the Secretary General’s report focuses on such issues. At the same time, NATO does not issue any net assessments of the balance between NATO and Russia and its capability to deter and fight. It does not openly address any of the many national problems and issues in current force structure nation-by-nation strength and readiness, and it has no coherent force and modernization plans for the future. Setting the Wrong Goals and Claiming Pointless Progress Instead, far too much of NATO’s public profile is focused on goals that are not only meaningless, but actively counterproductive. These goals set percentage of GDP and total defense spending levels that focus on arbitrary levels of spending with no ties to military needs or effectiveness. As the Secretary General’s report notes (p. 34), At the 2014 Summit in Wales, NATO leaders endorsed a Defense Investment Pledge. The pledge called for all Allies that did not already meet the NATO-agreed guideline of spending 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense to stop cuts to defense budgets, gradually increase spending, and aim to move towards spending 2% of GDP on defense within a decade. Allies also agreed, in that same time-frame, to move towards spending at least 20% of annual defense expenditure on major new equipment, including related research and development. What passes for progress reporting is progress in meeting the percentage objectives regardless of whether this is the right priority for a given country or if it will strengthen the Alliance. The Secretary General’s annual report summarizes such progress as follows: At the Brussels Summit in July, NATO leaders agreed there is a new sense of urgency to invest 2% of GDP on defense and to have credible national plans on how to meet this goal. NATO Allies will continue to invest in developing, acquiring and maintaining the capabilities the Alliance needs to defend its nearly one billion citizens. The Alliance attaches great importance to ongoing efforts to ensure fair burden-sharing in all three elements of the Defense Investment Pledge: defense expenditure; investments in capabilities; and contributions to NATO’s operations, missions and activities. In 2018, the United States accounted for half of the Allies' combined GDP and almost 70% of combined defense expenditures. At the same time, European Allies and Canada are continuing to spend more on defense. In 2018, seven Allies reached the 2% defense spending guideline, up from three in 2014. In real terms, defense spending among European Allies and Canada increased by almost 4% from 2017 to 2018. Furthermore, in the period from 2016 to 2018, they have contributed an additional cumulative spending of over USD 41 billion. Allies also made progress on the commitment to invest 20% or more of defense expenditure in major new capabilities. In 2018, 25 Allies spent more in real terms on major equipment than they did in 2017. The number of Allies meeting the NATO agreed 20% guideline rose to 16 in 2018. As Figure One shows, these goals focus the alliance on the wrong objectives in ways that encourage pointless burdening sharing debates over the wrong objectives, and divide it in ways that serve no functional purpose. Ignoring the Threat and Russia’s Level of Spending The NATO percentage goals also ignore a key underlying reality in the relative level of effort by NATO and Russia: Its one major potential threat. This is to some extent the natural result of the lack of any public or transparent effort to tie NATO military efforts to some net assessment of the extent to which Russia is a threat, show NATO’s relative capability by key sub-region and mission, and assesses how well each member is doing in reinforcing NATO’s deterrent and defense capabilities. As Figures Two and Three show, however, setting such percentage goals ignores a more fundamental reality. It assumes that NATO’s weaknesses are dominated by its level of spending and not by its lack of cohesive, coordinated effort to use its resources effectively. If one uses the Secretary General’s report for NATO data, and the IISS Military Balance for Russian expenditures – spending data which U.S. experts agree are roughly the same as U.S. intelligence estimates – these two Figures show that one gets the following results:

#### Not all NATO countries spend the same amounts

Alex Lazar, 7-27-2016, "Five Reasons Why NATO Nations Don't Always Pay Their Fair Share," NBC News, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/five-reasons-why-nato-nations-don-t-always-pay-their-n619966> (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 7-4-2022)

Currently, only the United States, Greece, Great Britain, Estonia and Poland have spent an average of 2 percent of GDP on their own defenses. The United States by far spends the most, with the average being 3.61 percent of GDP. The other countries spend around 1.5 percent or less, with Luxembourg coming in last at merely 0.44 percent of GDP. Iceland spends nothing on defense, but has no armed forces. Why do some NATO countries spend less of a percentage of GDP on defense than others? In short, they can’t afford it. Michael Corgan, an associate professor of international relations at Boston University’s Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, argues that health and retirement benefits promised to Europe’s aging population, combined with high taxes, would make it very difficult for such countries to spend much more on defense without enacting policies that would be difficult for their citizens to swallow. “Virtually no democratically elected government could survive either situation,” Corgan told NBC News. The U.S., on the other hand, already spends a lot more on defense. [Clinton: 'I'm proud to stand by our allies in NATO'](https://www.nbcnews.com/video/clinton-i-m-proud-to-stand-by-our-allies-in-nato-734439491911) Heather Conley, the senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia and the Arctic at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says that increased U.S. defense spending over the past decade has greatly increased that spending gap, while noting that the U.S. military has become increasingly focused on the Middle East and Asia, and less so in Europe. With Russia taking provocative actions in the region, such as in Crimea, however, many European countries are now facing the consequences.

### Regional Flanks

#### East flank focus undermines NATO effectiveness

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NATO has always struggled to articulate and deploy forces to protect and defend its southern flank and has devoted too little strategic attention to the Mediterranean over the last few years while powers such as Russia have consistently reinforced their military presence. With a dramatic increase in conflict as well as migration challenges, NATO and the European Union need to be an effective and unified presence in the Mediterranean despite disagreements with Turkey. The European Union relies on NATO intelligence and other support to execute many of its missions, so a diminished NATO also diminishes the European Union.

Absent more focus on the Mediterranean, Ankara and Southern European NATO members may conclude that the alliance has become, de facto, exclusively focused on its eastern flank. These members may see to protect and pursue their own interests in the region as well, modeling Turkey’s behavior of ad hoc arrangements, new regional alignments, and reversible bilateral understandings, thus creating even greater regional instability.

## Aff

### Tensions Amplify Solvency

#### These tensions AMPLIFY solvency instead of reducing it

Daniel S. Hamilton, 5-30-2022, , Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/10309905/h-diplo-roundtable-xxiii-39-hanhimaki%C2%A0-pax-transatlantica%C2%A0, "H-Diplo Roundtable XXIII-39 on Hanhimaki. Pax Transatlantica: America and Europe in the Post-Cold War Era," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-4-2022)

In this clear and compelling volume, Jussi Hanhimäki takes on the “paradox” he sees at the heart of the transatlantic relationship: a “great success story that is always at the brink of catastrophe” (7). Hanhimäki goes beyond doom-and-gloom headlines by placing recent transatlantic disputes within the deeply embedded political, economic, and security ties that hold the transatlantic community together even in times of crisis.

Hanhimäki does not dismiss very real differences that have often shaped US-European relations. He shows, however, that such tensions have never led to a transatlantic crack-up, in part because they remind policymakers and opinion leaders of the tremendous stakes each side of the North Atlantic has developed in a densely interwoven alliance of prosperous democracies. “If anything,” he concludes, such disagreements are “the creative lifeblood of the transatlantic relationship” (21).

Hanhimäki was motivated to write this book in part as a counterpoint to Robert Kagan’s celebrated analysis that “Americans are from Mars and Europe is from Venus.” Writing at the time of considerable transatlantic debate over George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq, Kagan hit a nerve by concluding that when it came to deciding national priorities and defining foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe had “parted ways.''[1]

Hanhimäki’s volume is essentially a Kagan-style book that argues the opposite premise. Like Kagan, Hanhimäki does not attempt a detailed empirical study, something he has done in other works.[2] Instead, he looks at transatlantic patterns of interaction within the security space of NATO, the economic space of trade and investment flows, and the internal politics of the transatlantic political space. These three intertwined spaces form the foundation of what he refers to as Pax Transatlantica.

Despite a sense of continuing crisis, he shows how the transatlantic security space has expanded and the transatlantic economic space has become more deeply interconnected. He compares domestic political dynamics of each side of the Atlantic and finds many similar trends. His conclusion: the United States and Europe are far from ‘parting ways’; in fact, the structural interdependencies that bind the two sides of the North Atlantic together have become more, not less, important over past decades.

Hanhimäki first recounts the ups and downs of the transatlantic rollercoaster by taking issue with the notion that the Cold War had been a golden age of transatlantic cooperation. The notion of a ‘transatlantic community’ may have been born during the Cold War, but more often than not it was a community of strife, punctuated by such major internal conflicts as France’s decision to exit NATO’s unified military command, disputes over burden-sharing, nuclear deterrence, out-of-area engagements, national subsidies and trade rules. Far from threatening the transatlantic alliance, Hanhimäki argues that these disputes were sources of vibrancy and dynamism. The United States and Europe “thrived” on competition and disagreement, he argues: “Indeed, the key to the success of the West in the Cold War was its ability to remain united while being perpetually divided” (33-34).

#### Aff – all the dispute you locate increase plan’s solvency

David Ryan, 5-30-2022, University College Cork https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/10309905/h-diplo-roundtable-xxiii-39-hanhimaki%C2%A0-pax-transatlantica%C2%A0, "H-Diplo Roundtable XXIII-39 on Hanhimaki. Pax Transatlantica: America and Europe in the Post-Cold War Era," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-4-2022)

Though Hanhimäki’s work is intentionally focused on the sphere within the north and west, one has to question the identity of the shared values. After all, with NATO out of area operations, one needs to further consider the basis of the liberal values. The extent to which these values drove decisions and methods in Iraq and Afghanistan needs further consideration. Though not a part of Hanhimäki’s argument, one might consider the centrality of these values in the wars in Vietnam and in the earlier period of European colonialism. During the Cold War, with the transitions from colonialism to decolonisation, there was much for the western powers to disagree upon, but also a lot to question the basis of ‘liberalism’ in their international interactions. This was also, of course, the very period in which NATO was formed and grew.[30] In his From Plato to NATO, David Gress emphasises the cracks rather than the paint which covered the disagreements. But even in the “grand narrative” the emphasis on liberal, pluralist democracy and an uncertain commitment to the market economy, “… suffered from the weakness of liberalism: the illusion of newness, economic reductionism, and an inability to choose between the negative and positive ideas of liberty – the idea that saw liberty and freedom from coercion versus the idea of liberty as self-realization.” [31] Some of the dominant European powers could not look too far into their pasts to maintain any sense of a prevalent liberalism; in that sense, but only at the level of meta-narrative, the United States with its formal ideologies offered a new conceptual identity, centred on the narrowly defined purpose of NATO.[32] Moreover, the Cold War West, from which NATO emerged, “… could not contain any substantive definitions of liberty or democracy for no such substantive definitions could command general agreement.” These values were read in different ways, even within the same conceptual West. Gress concludes, “to enroll such contradictory ideas in a common front required that the distinctions be ignored or elided.”[33] Hanhimäki emphasises that the robust disagreements that are present add strength to the vitality of the West and NATO.

### Cooperate Despite Tension

#### NATO can overcome disagreements to cooperate on specific issues

Jens Stoltenberg, Jul 11, 2018, NATO Secretary General https://twitter.com/AtlanticCouncil/status/1017098383851446277, "," (ermo/sms, Acc:7-4-2022)

Atlantic Council @AtlanticCouncil NATO's @jensstoltenberg:

"Despite disagreements on trade, climate change, the Iran nuclear deal, or the discussion on defense spending… NATO has been able to deliver… and actually strengthen what we do together." #NATOEngages 3/

#### NATO can overcome disagreements and cooperate

David Yost, March 2010, Professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229789395\_NATO's\_evolving\_purposes\_and\_the\_next\_Strategic\_Concept, "NATO's evolving purposes and the next Strategic Concept," International Affairs 86(2):489 - 522 (ermo/sms, Acc:7-4-2022)

Is there a conflict between the Alliance's original and enduring purpose of collective defence and its post-Cold War crisis management functions? This is an ill-framed debate, because the home base must be secure in order to support expeditionary power projection. The allies have, moreover, moved away from a static, reactive, and territorial concept of collective defence towards a more ‘proactive’ and ‘anticipatory’ approach. Some experts have even referred to a ‘deterritorialization’ of collective defence. Other issues also illustrate the changing dimensions of collective defence—missile defence, cyber warfare, space operations, the risk of state-sponsored terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, political–military dynamics in the Middle East and the Asia–Pacific region, and the risk of a non-Article 5 operation becoming a collective defence contingency. Despite disagreements on how to pursue shared goals, the allies may yet demonstrate that they have the vision and political will to meet the new challenges. The question of the Alliance's ‘level of ambition’ in capabilities is inseparable from that of its agreed purposes and burden-sharing to achieve them.

#### Disagreements don’t prelude cooperation

Atlantic Council, No Date, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/region/northern-europe/page/59/, "Northern Europe Archives," (ermo/sms, Acc:7-4-2022)

Northern Europe

Northern Europe holds great geostrategic importance to the transatlantic community as trade routes, emerging competition in the Arctic, and sustained Russian pressure make the region a key security concern for competing powers. Northern European states are active members of the transatlantic community, and they face similar concerns with their allies and partners: climate change, foreign influence campaigns, disinformation, and growing populist sentiment. Despite disagreements on fundamental policy issues, the United States must continue to engage its regional allies and partners.

### US Leadership Solves Turkey

#### US leadership stabilizes NATO-Turkey situation (Aff)

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Eastern Mediterranean Principles

The preamble of NATO’s Charter states that its members pledge to “promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.” All NATO allies, including Turkey, need to promote stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. A first step would be to create an agreed set of principles to include: (1) ensure that all regional partners reap the benefits of energy exploration in the region, with a path toward equitable sharing of energy revenues acting as a confidence-building measure toward restarting the Cyprus peace process; (2) contain Russian influence and presence in the region; (3) ensure NATO’s freedom of action from the Black Sea through to the Mediterranean; (4) work toward regional stability in the Middle East and North Africa region, including counterterrorism efforts; (5) uphold international legal norms and UN resolutions, such as the UN arms embargo on Libya and efforts to reach a cease-fire, as well as countries’ territorial or maritime integrity (regardless of existing disputes); and (6) redouble efforts to avoid future maritime incidents in the Eastern Mediterranean between NATO allies by establishing new procedures.

Stronger U.S. political and security involvement in the region will help strengthen NATO’s resolve in the Eastern Mediterranean, be a bulwark against Russia’s growing military presence, and better balance tensions between France and Turkey. The European Union (and France in particular) will need to identify pragmatic ways to engage with Turkey on a range of issues and not simply denounce its actions. As Turkey’s economic situation deteriorates, greater economic opportunities, such as expanding the EU bilateral trade relationship with Turkey or increasing U.S. foreign direct investment, might encourage Ankara to participate in the development of a regional framework of principles. Unfortunately, these relationships have grown very fragile as tensions have risen, and Turkey’s unilateral actions have significantly destabilized the region. Hopefully, refocusing on a set of agreed principles and incentivizing progress can restore NATO unity and restore focus on protecting its southern flank.

#### No Greece or Turkey solvency problems – Ukraine proves

Al Jazeera, 3-13-2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/13/greece-turkey-leaders-seek-common-ground-over-ukraine-war, "Greece, Turkey leaders seek common ground over Ukraine war," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-4-2022)

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis have held talks in Istanbul, seeking a rapprochement against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Both countries have key roles to play in the changing security situation in Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and their increased cooperation would have benefits for the region, the Turkish presidency said in a statement following Sunday’s talks.

“Despite the disagreements between Turkey and Greece, it was agreed at the meeting to keep communication channels open and to improve bilateral relations,” the statement said.

“Pointing out that Turkey and Greece have a special responsibility in the changing European security architecture with Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the meeting focused on the mutual and regional benefits of increasing cooperation between the two countries,” it added.

### AI Solves

#### AI creates unique openings for cooperation

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Coordinate Data Management, Privacy and Digital Taxation

With a Biden-Harris administration generally in favor of greater data protection, and with its interest in examining tech platform regulation (though with a different focus than the EU side) at home, there is an opening for coordinated consultation. Expanding the EU ‘code of conduct’ to a transatlantic effort is an initial idea. Aligning antitrust efforts more effectively and reframing “digital sovereignty” as ‘open to America’ will be necessary to advance transatlantic consensus. GAIA-X, the “by Europeans-for Europeans” cloud-based data storage and management initiative, and the Digital Services Act must allow for transatlantic coordination. Microsoft recently joining GAIA-X sends the right signal that the panoply of data issues is a joint transatlantic concern—but more importantly, it underlines that these solutions have to be built on the basis of leading-edge, effective technology.

The EU–U.S. Privacy Shield agreement will need urgent renegotiation. The US, UK and EU should be core partners in building a data space that allows for intelligence collection and managed, open data flows while balancing privacy and fundamental rights concerns adequately. The Privacy Shield attempted—however insufficiently—to remedy the shortcomings of the earlier Safe Harbor Agreement, which was invalidated by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) because of perceived National Security Agency (NSA) overreach in collection and usage of foreign data. Still, even with the fixes introduced into the Privacy Shield, weaknesses remained around questions of independent and authoritative redress for Europeans and legal issues around standard contractual clauses designed to regulate data transfers to the U.S. The ECJ voided the Privacy Shield in July 2020, leaving thousands of U.S. and EU companies uncertain how to proceed.

For as much as Americans may have overreached on data intelligence in the early years of these agreements, intelligence cooperation based on signals and digital financial transaction tracing (all based on data) are predominantly requested by Europeans—and have measurably reduced terrorism in Europe. Transatlantic intelligence and security agencies will have to balance the demands of security and privacy in a more equal partnership, creatively rethinking a surveillance security regime that both America and its allies need to confront the new threats in a multipolar world.

On AI, the US and EU must sweep away the concept of competition within the alliance and develop common goals — and ethics standards — for the use of autonomous technology. The EU’s current plans on AI could tip into protectionism, and at worst significantly hamper the kind of R&D necessary to keep pace with progress in the US and China. Expanding the Trump era US-UK AI agreement quickly to include EU member states would clear the way toward a Transatlantic AI Agreement, as suggested by the EU Commission in December 2020.

### Cyber Solves

#### Cyber can reunify NATO

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Stop ceding the cyber realm to Russia and China

Russia has successfully reframed the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention on Cybercrime to its advantage. China has asserted its leadership in UN specialized groups, to set standards in cyber or adjacent areas. They are already using these seemingly bureaucratic victories to establish rules that make it easier to exploit the internet. Increased transatlantic leadership in multilateral and international bodies is essential to the preservation of liberal values in the institutional system. This applies equally to standard-setting in the ICT area, where China has made fast inroads. China has already appointed the heads of the International Telecommunications Union, the International Standards Organization and the International Electrotechnical Commissions. The transatlantic alliance needs to be putting forward strong, common positions at these bodies where possible, and push back against blatant efforts by the Chinese to control these bodies. Members of the transatlantic alliance should ensure they have implemented the UN Group of Governmental Expert (UN GGE) norms at home and continue to expand investments in a robust international cyber-security architecture, through real-world capacity-building exercises with like-minded democracies, to help allies identify gaps in their cyber armor. Better tracing and attribution capacities should make joint sanctions regimes against cyber attacks increasingly possible: Expanding the summer 2020 EU cyber sanctions transatlantically could be a way forward.

### 2030 Validates Solvency

#### 2030 proves NATO is open to discussion

NPA, 7-4-2021, NATO Parliamentary Assembly https://www.nato-pa.int/news/virtual-visit-france-nato-parliamentarians-discuss-space-security-biotech-advances-and-nato-st, "NATO PA," In virtual visit to France, NATO Parliamentarians discuss space security, biotech advances and NATO S&T cooperation | NATO PA (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)

Finally, the delegation also learned of the importance of cooperation in the field of S&T, and in particular the role of the Collaboration Support Office (CSO) in NATO's Science and Technology Organisation (STO). John-Mikal STØRDAL, CSO Director, emphasised that “collaborative Science and Technology within NATO has enabled the Alliance to produce the most advanced and efficient defence systems the world has ever seen.” He warned that there is a real possibility that NATO could lose its technological edge but stressed that the work of the Assembly’s Science and Technology Committee has had a positive impact in raising awareness of this possibility, citing the 2018 NATO PA report, Maintaining the Edge and Enhancing Alliance Agility. “Today, emerging and disruptive technologies are firmly placed on the agenda for NATO 2030, as was clear in the last Summit Communique,” he said.

### US Model Solves

#### **Other countries will model US action – dealing with American problems now means global security later**

Andrew W. Eichner, spring 2020, “The Limitations of System Autonomy: Analyzing Obstacles to the Vision of Autonomous Horizons and the Inevitable Future of Warfare,” Washburn Law Journal, (accessed through LexisNexis software) https://advance.lexis.com/document?crid=dd10ccd5-b0a7-4e35-8886-4b0cdc98cdcb&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fanalytical-materials%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5YN8-87X1-FFFC-B085-00000-00&pdsourcegroupingtype=&pdcontentcomponentid=152481&pdmfid=1516831&pdisurlapi=true, (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 6-29-2022)

Potential problems may arise if the Air Force or other DoD components begin utilizing more fully autonomous machines, especially in lethal operations. Despite noting the importance of continued human-system interaction, the Office of the Chief Scientist predicted that "as the capabilities of autonomy increase, (including the ability to handle a broader range of situations and uncertainty) it is anticipated that the need for human intervention will decline." 26Just four years after releasing Autonomous Horizons, the Office of the Chief Scientist already appears to have envisioned expanding the roles of autonomous systems even further as detailed in The Way Forward, suggesting that autonomous systems "should be able to take on a subordinate, peer, or supervisory roleand change that role with humans or other [autonomous systems] within the organization, [\*213] as the task or environment demands." 27Given the progress that has been made in autonomous machines and the need to remain ahead of our rivals, it is foreseeable that in the next thirty years warfighting machines will be designed to require fewer human inputs given the complex and evolving nature of today's battlefields. 28 As the prospect of fully autonomous machines becomes more of a technological possibility, the DoD should anticipate opposition from the international community. Special efforts should be made to ensure that autonomous systems conform with international customs and practices. As discussed further in subsection II.C, the U.S. is likely to be a global trendsetter with its approach to using autonomous systems in military operations. As such, its practices should set the expectation that international law should be respected when autonomous systems are utilized on the battlefield, which may require keeping their autonomous capabilities in check and ultimately limiting the developmental ceiling of the technology.

### A2 Unanimity

#### NATO doesn’t have to unanimously agree to be effective

Christopher Skaluba and Conor Rodihan, 1-18-2022, "No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective.," Atlantic Council, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/no-consensus-no-problem-why-nato-is-still-effective/> (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 7-3-2022)

Yet as the crisis evolves, decisions about how to support Ukraine will become more difficult, and there’s a limit to how unified NATO can be. While the West might agree on introducing tough new economic sanctions and reinforcing the Alliance’s eastern flank, boosting Kyiv’s military capacity—by supporting an insurgency, for instance, or [sending anti-tank weapons](https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-anti-tank-missiles-ukraine/)—will be impossible to achieve by consensus and is much more likely to come from individual members than under NATO auspices. This shouldn’t be surprising. Consider Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its ongoing support for separatists in Ukraine’s Donbas region: NATO actions in support of Kyiv have been more political than operational, leaving it to individual allies to provide munitions, equipment, and training to Ukrainian forces. And despite a recurrent pledge that Ukraine would one day be welcome to join the Alliance, as well as the sympathy expressed by allies for Ukraine’s plight, there’s been precious little progress on this front. NATO is primarily concerned about defending its members from Russian aggression—which it is also wary of provoking by supporting the Ukrainian military. Yet despite its lack of meaningful military support for Ukraine, the crisis has been the animating issue on the Alliance’s agenda since 2014. Russia’s attacks on Ukraine and its support for separatists have driven major NATO initiatives on [readiness](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_06/20180608_1806-NATO-Readiness-Initiative_en.pdf), [defense planning](https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-priorities/2021/06/13/nato-to-look-eastward-and-inward-at-summit/), [force posture](https://lc.nato.int/operations/enhanced-forward-presence-efp), [intelligence](https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/10/29/a-new-era-for-nato-intelligence/index.html), and [technology development](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_187607.htm), with an eye toward beefing up the Alliance’s northern and eastern flanks and deterring Russia in both the conventional and sub-threshold realms. As an institution established to safeguard Europe, it has successfully geared itself to deter the type of destabilizing Russian belligerence currently on display. Critics of the alliance (and even some supporters) [have interpreted NATO’s unwillingness](https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/474047-the-problems-plaguing-nato) to militarily support Ukraine—especially during the most significant challenge to the European security order since the Cold War—as an indicator of its declining relevance, timidity, or its divisions. But that overstates the importance of political consensus to NATO’s value and understates its role as an effective and flexible defensive alliance. This is a role with potentially critical benefits for Ukraine. First, it sets too high a bar for an alliance of thirty members with aligned, but distinct, priorities. Unanimity on every issue is impossible, let alone one as complex as military support to Ukraine. Debate and disagreement, as it should be for any democratic institution, are built-in features of NATO—not bugs. In reality, it’s astounding how often NATO does reach consensus about [issues big and small](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm), creating an unrealistic expectation that it always will. The opposite of consensus is not failure. Suggesting otherwise turns any debate that doesn’t end harmoniously into an indictment of NATO, playing straight into Russian propaganda. Second, a belief that NATO’s value is tied primarily to achieving consensus on every issue misses the more mundane (and important) ways it supports its allies and partners. Its [affinity for process](https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/praise-natos-dysfunctional-bureaucratic-tedium/)—particularly its ability to build a common situational understanding among its members—is an invaluable tool. Habits of consultation and information sharing, buttressed by deep cooperation on operations, intelligence sharing, defense planning, and interoperability, create the foundation upon which any consensus is to be built. Even in the absence of that agreement, the ability to collectively define threats and jointly train to confront them is immensely valuable in its own right. Third, these habits of cooperation give NATO members the flexibility to act outside of the Alliance’s frameworks. While NATO does much by consensus—such as its [missions in the Baltic states](https://lc.nato.int/operations/enhanced-forward-presence-efp)—the skills it helps members develop is central to enabling them to form separate coalitions for action. This happened recently with [ample success](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/part-3-future-anti-isis-coalition) in taking on the Islamic State. Such flexibility should be a point in NATO’s favor, not evidence of its ineptitude. In the case of military support for Ukraine, policymakers will find more attractive alternatives for dealing with Moscow’s aggression outside of the auspices of the Alliance. Up to and including its recent dialogue with Russia, it has taken a host of consensus actions to support Ukraine—from [condemning Kremlin aggression](https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/praise-natos-dysfunctional-bureaucratic-tedium/) and [standing up for Kyiv](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_190292.htm) politically to [reaffirming its open-door policy](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_190666.htm) with an expectation that Ukraine will eventually become a member. It might even [share intelligence and develop training and advisory programs](https://www.ft.com/content/1336c9be-f1c9-4545-9f85-3b07fcb746d6) for the Ukrainian military. And while it won’t find a consensus to fight, it could provide the foundation for certain allies to support Ukrainian forces in ways consistent with their national priorities outside of NATO. In that case, NATO’s enabling value to its members in complicating Putin’s cost-benefit assessment should be applauded. Last week’s NATO-Russia Council meeting showcased an Alliance working in lockstep and finding political consensus in responding to preposterous Russian demands. NATO should always strive for this degree of consensus. But if and when this crisis intensifies, and Putin advances further into Ukraine, expectations for NATO assistance will be raised, decisions about how to respond will become more difficult, and consensus will be more elusive. Despite the rhetoric we might hear in response, this is not evidence of NATO’s ineffectiveness—but rather a reflection of how democratic institutions function. And even absent consensus, NATO can still contribute invaluably to Ukraine’s sovereignty.

### Random

#### Chem prolif Mod

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Chemical Proliferation

The Chemical Weapons Convention identifies three main classes, called Schedules, of controlled substances.90 Schedule 1 substances have no peaceful use outside chemical weapons while Schedules 2 and 3 substances have small-scale and large-scale uses, respectively, outside chemical weapons. The main substances discussed in this section are sulfur mustard (“mustard gas”) and nerve agents, as well as their precursors. Chemical weapons are traditionally difficult to produce due to highly toxic and corrosive chemicals, and their sophistication can vary as evidence of production by the United States, the former Soviet Union, and Iraq.

Sulfur mustard production requires large amounts to be militarily effective. Even if produced in a small quantity, it is difficult to store and transport. It also possesses a relatively low casualty rate, and medical care has developed to ensure increased recovery rates. Its production historically involves ethylene oxide and hydrogen sulfide,91 both of which are gases at room temperature and therefore difficult to fathom production with AM. The intermediary product between these two chemicals and sulfur mustard is thiodiglycol, which is a common liquid solvent used in ballpoint pen ink and other plastics. It is of interest to private corporations, including Hewlett Packard, who cited it as a functional material in its patent for 3D printing technology in 2017.92 This patent does not indicate a threat of thiodiglycol production, but it signals interest of using it by private corporations. Without its direct application, exploration of similar chemicals with 3D printing could generate publicly or commercially available knowledge with utilizing it. Therefore, thiodiglycol is a medium risk in the long term, indicated in Table 2. Thiodiglycol requires hydrogen sulfide to produce the sulfur mustard, therefore proliferators need additional anti-corrosive equipment not aided with the use of 3D printing.

The tabun nerve agent poses a similar challenge as the required hydrogen cyanide reagent is necessary.93 Sarin and soman, other nerve agents, require hydrochloric acid or hydrogen fluoride, both highly corrosive. 3D-printed containers would not withstand storage or transport of these materials. The AM community would need to experiment more with corrosive reactions on mostly metal materials to ensure advantages over steel pipes and containers. Therefore, materials associated with nerve agent production pose a minimal threat. Table 2 shows the relatively small threat that chemical weapons alone pose.

It’s been well-recognized that moderately advanced chemical and pharmaceutical industries can enable chemical weapons production.94,95 Successful acquisition would require conversion of a standard plant to one that could produce chemical weapons. It is therefore possible that AM could be used to create equipment originally intended for a chemical plant that is eventually converted to a chemical weapons facility. An article has proposed effects of current AM technology on the chemical industry to include surgical preparation and drug delivery devices,96 although both are only projected and have not been demonstrated outside of an experimental setting. Many 3D printing applications for chemical application cross into the biomedical and biotechnology arena.